2004 - Femicides in Ciudad Juarez

Femicides in Ciudad Juarez

The following is excerpts from an account of the Ciudad Juarez femicides written by Michael Newton and published (in full) at www.crimelibrary.com:

Body Count
Jose Lopez Jimenez wasn't looking for trouble when he and a friend went for a stroll in the desert northeast of Ciudad Juarez on February 17, 2003. The two teenagers took their dogs along, searching the wasteland for bottles and cans, or any other cast-off articles that could be redeemed for pocket money. The last thing they expected to discover was a human body. Much less three.

The boys ran home to tell their parents, who then alerted the municipal police. The officers were skeptical at first and responded slowly. But when detectives reached the scene off Mimbre Street at 2:00 p.m., any notion of a hoax evaporated. They saw the remains of three barely concealed women.

The police wasted little time carting the bodies from the scene. They had the third corpse in an ambulance and ready to depart by 2:30, when a neighborhood bystander called their attention to a fourth corpse, a little away from the others. Most local reporters had already left to file their stories, but Miguel Perea, a photographer for Norte newspaper, remained to document the discovery of the fourth corpse.

These were not the first corpses found in the desert near the rundown suburb. Two other victims had been found a short distance away in October 2002; one of them later identified as 16-year-old Gloria Rivas. More recently, residents of nearby Lomas de Poleo had reported finding three more corpses in January 2003. But police and Attorney General Jesus Solis refused to confirm or deny the account.

The story took an even stranger turn on February 19, when authorities identified three of the victims. They were 17-year-old Juana Sandoval Reyna, missing since September 23, 2002; 16-year-old Esmeralda Juarez Alarcon, last seen January 8, 2003; and 18-year-old Violeta Alvarez Barrios, who vanished February 4, 2003. Each girl was last seen alive in downtown Juarez. When reporters asked about the fourth victim, police abruptly ended the briefing, and refused to acknowledge that there was another body.

That stubborn attitude was old news to the residents of Ciudad Juarez, where a mounting toll of brutal the border from El Paso. No two sources agree on the death toll of young women. The El Paso Times claims that there are "nearly 340" victims since 1993. Some of the cases have been solved, although unnamed "experts" speculate that "90 or more" may bhomicides had stunned the city - and attracted global attention -during the past decade. Body counts are a touchy subject in Ciudad Juarez, a bustling city across e serial murder victims. But no one seriously claims that one person is responsible for all of the murders.

In fact, police have jailed more than a dozen suspects - the first in 1995. Each new arrest is hailed as a "solution" to the grisly murder spree, but the body count still increases. Many residents and some discouraged investigators now believe that the police themselves may be behind some of the murders. At the very least, many think the police are involved in an ongoing cover-up.

A decade after the start of the official roster of the dead, only one thing is certain: all females are in danger on the streets of Ciudad Juarez.

Silent Screams
The first to die, officially, was Alma Chavira Farel, a young woman found beaten, raped and strangled to death in the Campestre Virreyes district of Ciudad Juarez on January 23, 1993. She may not even have been the city's first female murder victim in 1993, since local disappearances exceed known homicides each year. But Chavira remains the first acknowledged victim of a predator the media would later dub "the Juarez Ripper" or El Depredador Psicata. While no mutilations were recorded in Chavira's case, many subsequent victims suffered "similar" slashing wounds to their breasts.

Police acknowledged 16 more murders of women in Ciudad Juarez by year's end, with the last recorded on December 15. That case was solved, along with three others. In the dozen cases still unsolved today, five of the victims remain unidentified. Of the 12, at least four were raped. Cause of death in those cases included four strangulations, four stabbings (with one set afire afterward), one beating and one gunshot. Decomposition ruled out a determination in the last two homicides.

In 1994 police acknowledged eight unsolved murders of women in Ciudad Juarez; "possible culprits" were named in three other cases, but none were arrested. Three of the dead are unidentified today; the others ranged in age from 11 to 35. This time, at least four were raped. Of those whose cause of death is listed, six were strangled, two stabbed, one beaten to death, and one burned alive.

Before that year of brutality ended, state criminologist Oscar Maynez Grijalva warned Ciudad Juarez police that some of their unsolved murders might be the work of a serial killer. In later interviews, Maynez said his warning was ignored.

1995 was worse yet, with at least 19 women slain by mid-September. Eight of the victims remain unidentified, with one case solved and "probable suspects" named (but not convicted) in two others. At least four of the victims were raped. Where cause of death could be determined, six were strangled, one stabbed and one shot. Three of the four victims found in September alone presented police with an obvious pattern: each had her right breast severed, with the left nipple bitten off.

It appeared that at least one serial killer was stalking the women of Ciudad Juarez, linked by a similar modus operandi to three of the most recent crimes. But authorities did not seem overly concerned.

In October, detectives claimed they had solved the case. They had detained a suspect who was charged with one of the city's brutal sex murders. Best of all, he was a foreigner.

Predator
Suspect Abdel Latif Sharif was born in Egypt in 1947. Decades later, he would claim to have been sexually abused as a child, allegedly sodomized by his father and other male relatives. He emigrated to the U.S. in 1970, settling first in New York City, where he soon established a reputation for alcohol-fueled promiscuity. Acquaintances, questioned long after the fact, recalled his obsessive interest in young girls.

Fired from his job for suspected embezzlement in 1978, Sharif moved to New Hope, Pennsylvania. John Pascoe, a former friend later recalled a deer-hunting expedition with Sharif, where the Egyptian reportedly wounded a buck and then tortured the dying animal. Pascoe also claimed that when girls were in Sharif's company they "often" disappeared. But none of the alleged victims was ever found. Pascoe says he ended the friendship in 1980, after finding various possessions of an unnamed "missing" girl in Sharif's home and a mud-caked shovel on the porch.

By 1981, Sharif had settled in Palm Beach, Florida. Reportedly a chemist and an engineer, Sharif was hired by Cercoa Inc. His talents were sufficiently impressive that the company created a department specifically for him. On May 2 he took a 23-year-old woman home, beat and raped her repeatedly, then suddenly turned solicitous and said, "Oh, I've hurt you. Do you think you need to go to a hospital?" Cercoa bankrolled Sharif's defense in that case, and again in August, when he attacked a second woman in West Palm Beach. Sharif received probation for the first rape and served only 45 days for the second. Cercoa fired Sharif the next year because of his mounting legal bills.

Resettled in Gainesville, Florida, Sharif was married briefly. The divorce was the result of beating his bride unconscious. He advertised for a live-in housekeeper on March 17, 1983, then beat and repeatedly raped a 23-year-old woman who answered the ad, telling her, "I will bury you out back in the woods. I've done it before, and I'll do it again." Held without bond pending trial in that case, Sharif escaped from the Alachua County jail in January 1984 but was soon recaptured. On January 31, 1984, Sharif received a 12-year sentence for rape. Gordon Gorland, the prosecutor, promised reporters that on the day Sharif was released he would be "met at the prison gates and escorted to the plane" and be deported to Egypt.

But when Sharif was paroled in October 1989, he was not deported. He moved at once to Midland, Texas, and a job with Benchmark Research and Technology. The U.S. Department of Energy singled him out for praise, and Sharif was photographed shaking hands with former U.S. Sen. Phil Gramm.

Sharif was arrested again in 1991, this time for drunk driving. The arrest alerted a former acquaintance from Florida, now living in Texas, who reported Sharif to the Border Patrol as a fugitive from deportation proceedings. A lengthy series of hearings ensued. The matter was still pending two years later when Sharif held a woman captive in his home and raped her repeatedly.

His deportation defense lawyer offered the government a deal: if the latest charges were dismissed, Sharif would voluntarily leave the U.S. In May 1994 Sharif moved to Ciudad Juarez, working at one of Benchmark's maquiladora factories, and resided in the exclusive Rincones de San Marcos district. In October 1995 a young maquiladora worker accused Sharif of raping her at his home. She also said that Sharif threatened to kill her and dump her corpse in Lote Bravo, a desert region south of town where several other victims had been found. Those charges were later withdrawn. But detectives had learned by then that Sharif had dated 17-year-old Elizabeth Castro Garcia, who was found raped and murdered in August.

Sharif was charged with that murder and finally convicted at trial in March 1999. He received a 30-year sentence. Although police called Sharif a serial killer, the conviction did not solve the grisly mystery of Ciudad Juarez. The murders continued - even escalated - after his arrest. One month after Sharif was in custody, police acknowledged that 520 people had vanished in the past 11 months and that "an important percentage of them are female adolescents."

Another solution was needed - and authorities offered it in the form of a bizarre conspiracy theory.

Los Rebeldes
Between Sharif's arrest and the first week of April 1996 at least 14 more female victims were slain in Ciudad Juarez. Their ages ranged from 10 to 30. Where cause of death was known, 10 had been stabbed, one shot and one strangled. At least four suffered unspecified mutilations after death, and one victim, Adrianna Torres, 15, fit the pattern of three other slayings, with her right breast severed and her left nipple bitten off.

The continuing slaughter belied official reports that the city's homicide wave had ended with Abdel Sharif's arrest. Residents were frightened. The local police was embarrassed. They needed an explanation for the murders; but one that would not exonerate their prime suspect. They got their wish on April 8, 1996, when 18-year-old Rosario Garcia Leal's raped and mutilated body was discovered.

Among those questioned in the latest case was Hector Olivares Villalba, a member of a local street gang called Los Rebeldes ("The Rebels"). In custody, Olivares claimed he had participated in Garcia's murder on December 7, 1995. Half a dozen Rebels were involved, he claimed, including gang leader Sergio Armendariz Diaz (also known as El Diablo). Armed with Olivares' confession (later recanted as the product of police torture), officers raided several nightclubs and detained 300. They winnowed out nine more Rebels, including Armendariz, Juan Contreras Jurado (El Grande), Carlos Hernandez Molina, Carlos Barrientos Vidales, Romel Cerniceros Garcia, Fernando Guermes Aguirre, Luis Adrade, Jose Juarez Rosales, and Erika Fierro.

The nine, with Olivares, were accused of plotting with Sharif to free him from prison by murdering local women and thus make it seem as if the original "Ripper" was still at large. Police claimed that some of the Rebels had visited Sharif in jail and were paid for their "copycat" crimes. Juan Contreras told police Armendariz had sent him to collect "a packet" from Sharif in prison. The envelope contained $4,000 in cash. Later, Contreras alleged, he had joined Armendariz and other Rebels in the rape-murder of a young woman known as Lucy.

Contreras also later recanted his statement, and the charges were dropped against suspects Ceniceros, Fierro, Guermes, Hernandez and Olivares. The remainder are incarcerated pending trial (a slow process in Mexican courts), and El Diablo earned a separate six-year prison sentence for leading the February 1998 gang-rape of a 19-year-old fellow inmate.

The other Rebels all claim they were tortured by police. Some display burn scars, which they say are the product of crude torture with cigars and cigarettes. Authorities, meanwhile, stand by their charges, claiming that Sharif and the Rebels together committed 17 murders. Chihuahua's medical examiner goes further, telling reporters that dental casts from Armendariz "identically" match bite marks found on the breasts of at least three victims.

But a Mexican court ruled in 1999 that there was insufficient evidence to charge Abdel Sharif as a conspirator in any of the slayings attributed to the Rebels. Even before the ruling, police concluded that their conspiracy theory was deficient.

Just as the murders had not stopped with Sharif's arrest, neither did they end with the round-up of Los Rebeldes. In fact, the rate of killings continued to climb.

Kill Zone
The arrest of Los Rebeldes changed nothing in Juarez. The brutal murders continued and community groups accused police of negligence or worse. At least 16 female victims were slain between late April and November 1996. Eight remain unidentified. Five were stabbed, three shot, and one was found in a drum of acid. In several cases advanced decomposition made determinations about cause of death or sexual assault impossible.

The following year there were 17 unsolved murders of females. Again they ranged in age from 10 to 30 years, and seven of the dead were never identified. While rape was confirmed in only four cases, the position and nudity of several other corpses suggested sexual assault. In the cases where the cause of death could be determined, five were stabbed, three were strangled, three shot, and two beaten.

Statistically, 1998 was the city's worst year yet. There were 23 on the books by December. Six remain unidentified. The killings reflected the usual pattern of stabbings, stranglings, bullets and burning. Rocio Barrazza Gallegos was killed on September 21 in the parking lot of the city's police academy. She was strangled inside a patrol car by a cop assigned to the "murdered women" case. Authorities described the death of 20-year-old Rosalina Veloz Vasquez, found dead on January 25, as "similar to 20 other murders in the city."

And indeed, by 1998 the long-running investigation had become a numbers game. In May, media reports referred to "more than 100 women raped and killed" in Ciudad Juarez. A month later, reports from the same source (Associated Press) raised the number to 117. In October 1998 another AP report placed the official body count at 95, while a women's advocacy group, Women for Juarez, placed the total at somewhere between 130 and 150.

Mexico's Human Rights Commission issued a report in 1998 castigating the police. But politicians suppressed it to avoid adverse impact on upcoming state elections. Still clinging to suspect Abdel Sharif, Attorney General Arturo Chavez told Reuters on June 10, 1998 that "police think another serial killer may be at work due to similarities in three crimes this year." At year's end, on December 9, the Associated Press reported: "At least 17 bodies show enough in common - the way shoelaces were tied together, where they were buried, how they were mutilated - that investigators say at least one serial killer is at work. And 76 other cases bear enough similarities that investigators say one or more copycats may be at work."

In fact, all that anyone really knew was that the murders were continuing.

Los Choferes

The first quarter of 1999 brought with it the usual catalog of carnage: at least eight more female victims. Abdel Sharif's trial for the murder of Elizabeth Castro began on March 3, but if authorities thought it would solve the case, they were sadly mistaken.

In the predawn hours of March 18, a 14-year-old girl staggered up to the door of a stranger's home on the city's outskirts. Bloody and sobbing, she told her story of rape and near-murder. She said she had been assaulted and nearly choked to death by the hands of a maquiladora bus driver named Jesus Guardado Marquez. His nicknames were El Dracula and El Tolteca. A background check on Guardado revealed one prior conviction for sexual assault. By the time police went looking for him, he had vanished from Ciudad Juarez with his pregnant wife.

Authorities in Durango arrested Guardado a few days later. Guardado later claimed that he was beaten by police on arrival in Ciudad Juarez; the officers countered with claims that Guardado confessed to multiple murders and named four accomplices. The other men in custody were: Victor Moreno Rivera (El Narco), Augustin Toribio Castillo (El Kiani), Bernardo Hernando Fernandez (El Samber) and Jose Gaspar Cerballos Chavez (El Gaspy). All were maquiladora bus drivers, collectively dubbed Los Choferes ("The Chauffeurs"). Police claimed that Moreno was the ringleader of the rape-murder team, collaborating with Abdel Sharif in another copycat scheme intended to spring Sharif from prison.

Charged with a total of 20 murders, all the Choferes denied any role in the crimes. They said that their confinement was brutal, that they had been beaten, choked and shocked with electricity. It was the torture, they said, that accounted for their incriminating statements. The statements could not be trusted because they were given under duress. Sharif, for his part, denied any contact with Los Choferes and maintained his innocence.

While police were convinced of their latest conspiracy theory, the facts contradicted the theory. The media reported in May 1999 that "nearly 200 women" had been murdered since 1993 - a substantial jump over October 1998's body count of at least 117. Retired FBI profiler Robert Ressler had already come and gone from Ciudad Juarez, leaving more questions than answers in his wake. A team of active-duty FBI agents also tried their luck at profiling the Juarez Ripper, with no success. Steve Salter, the Mexican official who enlisted the FBI's help, told the Dallas Morning News, "These homicides are up to a point where we have to do whatever is possible to resolve it."

With another desert summer approaching, police and civilians alike feared that the situation would only get worse.

The Disappeared
Theories flourished in Ciudad Juarez as the death toll continued to climb through 1999 and 2000. Press reports from the summer of 1999 typically offered body counts between 180 and 190, sometimes coupled with a reminder that "at least 95 women" were still missing. Chihuahua authorities claimed that FBI agents had endorsed their conviction of Abdel Sharif, while El Paso FBI agents indignantly denied it.

And there were other investigators. Candice Skrapec, a Canadian-born instructor at California State University in Fresno and a "world-renowned expert on serial killers" spent the summer of 1999 advising Mexican authorities. She had followed the case for more than a decade and had already reached some conclusions. In July 1987 Skrapec told the Toronto Star that "Railway Killer" Rafael Resendez-Ramirez, lately posted to the FBI's Ten Most Wanted list on suspicion of multiple murders in the U.S., was also a suspect in the slaughter around Ciudad Juarez. A month later, Skrapec told the Star that she believed "at least three serial killers are involved in the unsolved murders of 182 women in Juarez" since 1993. Resendez-Ramirez was still on the list, along with Sharif, Los Rebeldes and Los Choferes. Having thus identified no less than 11 suspects, Skrapec went on to say that "there may be even more murders that could be tied to the three suspected serial killers, and that they were operating in 1992." Finally, Skrapec claimed that "of the 182 total deaths, 40 to 75 had been sexually violated."

Rafael Resendez-Ramirez was later cleared of involvement in the Chihuahua slayings, which continued nonstop after he was arrested. A new mystery surfaced in December 1999, with discovery of a mass grave outside Ciudad Juarez, initially thought to contain as many as 100 decomposing corpses. In fact, it yielded only nine, including three U.S. citizens. The fact that U.S. citizens were among the dead prompted an entirely new line of inquiry. "Still a mystery," the Dallas Morning News declared, "is what happened to nearly 200 people, including 22 U.S. citizens who, in many cases, vanished after being detained by men with Mexican police uniforms or credentials."

Those vanished persons, collectively dubbed Los Desaparecidos ("the disappeared"), were still missing a year after the mass grave's discovery, despite joint investigations by Mexican and U.S. authorities. Some were thought to be casualties of the drug wars that periodically rock Ciudad Juarez, but apparent police involvement in the kidnappings rekindled suspicion. An El Paso-based organization, the Association of Relatives and Friends of Disappeared Persons, kept pressure on Chihuahua authorities to recover the missing, so far without result.

Even then, no one spoke for the murdered and missing maquiladora workers. Another year would pass before any protests were organized on their behalf. By that time, some sources would claim that the body count had doubled.

Outcry
The advent of a new millennium did nothing to relieve the Ciudad Juarez's ordeal. On Tuesday and Wednesday, November 6-7, 2001, skeletal remains of eight more women were found in a vacant lot 300 yards from the Association of Maquiladoras headquarters, a group representing most of the city's U.S.-owned export assembly plants. Police announced creation of a special task force to investigate the murders, with a $21,500 reward offered for capture of the killer(s), but the new display of energy consoled no one.

The latest victims were still unidentified on November 10, when Chihuahua officials announced the arrest of two 28-year-old bus drivers, Javier Garcia Uribe and Gustavo Gonzalez Meza, on charges of killing the eight women found three days earlier. Fernando Medina, a spokesman for the prosecutor's office, claimed both men "belong to a gang whose members are serving time for at least 20 of the rape-murders," and that they had identified the victims found on November 6-7 by name. Police named the dead as 19-year-old Maria Acosta, 20-year-old Claudia Gonzales, 15-year-old Esmerelda Herrera, 20-year-old Guadalupe Luna, 20-year-old Barbara Martinez, 19-year-old Veronica Martinez (no relation to Barbara), 17-year-old Laura Ramos, and 17-year-old Mayra Reyes.

The suspects, meanwhile, declared that any statements they had made were products of torture. Their lawyers received death threats, and one of them, Mario Escobedo Jr., was killed by police in a high-speed chase on February 5, 2002, after officers allegedly "mistook him for a fugitive." (In June 2002 a judge declared the shooting to be "self-defense.") Eleven weeks later, on April 22, police grudgingly confessed that DNA tests had failed to confirm any of their early victim identifications. Waffling again on November 5, 2002, prosecutors declared that new DNA tests had apparently confirmed the identity of Veronica Martinez, while yielding no results on the other seven. (Gonzalez died on February 8, 2003, allegedly from complications arising after surgery in jail.)

The Garcia-Gonzalez arrests - bringing the total of suspects in custody to 51 by some reports - had no apparent effect on the murder activity. Ten days after Garcia and Gonzalez were jailed, another young woman was found stripped and beaten to death in Ciudad Juarez. Six days after the "accidental" death of attorney Escobedo, the Inter-American Commission for Human Rights dispatched Marta Altolaguirre to investigate reports that would-be protesters around the city were harassed and threatened by police. The new publicity moved Mexican President Vincente Fox to order a new investigation by "federal crime specialists." Local prosecutors, resentful of that move, protested to the Dallas Morning News that "27 of the 76 cases" were solved, while "the other killings involving women have been isolated incidents."

Global publicity only shortened tempers in Ciudad Juarez. On March 9, 2002, Texas state legislators joined in a bi-national protest march through El Paso. Jorge Campos Murillo, a federal deputy attorney general in Mexico City, stirred reporters when he claimed that some of the slayings were committed by "juniors" - sons of wealthy Mexican families whose money and connections had spared them from prosecution. (Shortly after making those remarks, Campos was transferred to another job and refused all interviews.) The FBI resumed its investigation in October 2002. Their profiling efforts have been fruitless so far.

Ciudad Juarez's civic leaders remain keenly focused on business. After a large wooden cross was erected near the border, as a memorial to the murdered and missing women, Major Jesus Delgado received an angry letter from the Association of Business Owners and Professionals of Juarez Avenue, complaining that the display was "a horrible image for tourism."

The same day that letter was written, on September 23, 2002, police found two more women's corpses in Ciudad Juarez. One victim was strangled and partially disrobed; police claimed the other had died of a drug overdose. But special investigator David Rodriguez was "skeptical" of that determination. Another young woman, apparently beaten to death, was found on October 8.

The year ended badly for image-conscious merchants in Ciudad Juarez. Mexico's first lady, Marta Sahagun de Fox, publicly called for an end to the murders on November 25 as more than a thousand black-garbed women marched through Mexico City, protesting the sluggish investigation.
Detectives, meanwhile, had no shortage of suspects. In fact, they had too many -and some of them were policemen.

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Recent Developments in Juarez and Chihuahua: Fall 2003 to the Present

Introduction
The closing months of 2003 marked ten years since the rash of nearly 400 femicides in Ciudad Juarez and, increasingly, in the neighboring city of Chihuahua began. In the past year, growing domestic and international awareness and increased vigilance on the part of family members and activists in Chihuahua state forced the Mexican Government to take action (or at least the appearance action) to resolve the femicides. President Fox created two new federal offices to investigate and prevent the crimes, and sent over 1,000 police officers to Juarez. The Mexican Congress established a committee of senators to oversee government investigations. But despite increased attention and a series of government reports, not much has changed. The murder rate in Juarez is averaging nearly one per day so far in 2004 (including men), and the majority of femicides remain unresolved. The bodies of young women continue to appear in the desert around Juarez and in Chihuahua City. Investigators are no closer to solving the majority of the crimes. Several suspects are held in Chihuahua's jails, their detentions justified by confessions they claim were given under torture, a common "investigative technique' throughout Mexico, to the extent that confessions given under torture are accepted in Mexican courts.

In an October 2003 interview with Operation Digna, Alma Gomez of Justicia para Nuestras Hijas attributed what little progress has been made to the constant pressure of victim's families and non-governmental organizations:

At first, a woman was killed every 12 days, now it's every 9 or 10 days. So what has changed? There is more vigilance from the NGOs. Each time a body is found, we divulge information, initiate legal proceedings, etc. Now the NGOs have mechanisms for organizing information.

As Gomez explains, women's organizations and NGOs in Juarez have played a crucial role in the limited progress of the Juarez femicide investigations over the past several years. There has also been increasing attention on the part of the international community, from NGOs, some U.S. officials, and civil society.

Growing International Pressure
Over the last year, the international community focused increasing pressure on the Mexican government to resolve the human rights crisis in Juarez and Chihuahua. In August 2003, Amnesty International released a report condemning Mexican officials for negligence in the Juarez femicides, as well as threats and violence against human rights defenders. The scathing report criticized authorities for discriminating against murder victims and their families, and for treating each case in isolation, thereby denying "common gender-based characteristics" of the femicides.

Amnesty International criticized Chihuahua state police for their frequent refusal to open formal criminal investigations on the day women are reported missing. Currently investigations begin three days after a disappearance is reported, and even then the actual investigation is "informal," since it is not illegal to "disappear." The report documented failure to follow through on investigations, meaning that critical evidence and witnesses were lost rendering the cases virtually impossible to solve. Incredibly, responsibility for gathering evidence frequently falls on search parties organized by the families of missing women. The report found that forensic work has been inadequate and inaccurate, with authorities often mis-identifying victims.

The continued failure of authorities to keep families informed results in distrust. Falsification of evidence and the use of torture to obtain confessions leave families with little confidence that police are carrying out serious investigations. In fact, many family members have sided with "suspects" who are held in prison based on confessions gained by torture. Police and local officials often threaten lawyers, families and members of NGOs who make too much noise, accusing them of sullying the international image of Ciudad Juarez. Unprofessional police work and police corruption mean that the real perpetrators often enjoy impunity. The report critiqued the Office of the Special Prosecutor, established as an adjunct to the Federal Attorney General in 1998. By 2003, the office had been through several directors but remained ineffective in coordinating the investigations.

The Amnesty International report made a series of recommendations, including respect for the dignity of family members and victims, use of professional investigation techniques, and allocation of resources for community safety measures. The report directed special attention to local maquiladoras, encouraging authorities to ensure that owners meet legal obligations to workers. Amnesty International encouraged the federal government to assume responsibility for investigations. The report encouraged authorities to punish police for negligence and human rights abuses, and to ensure that human rights defenders are able to carry out their work without threats.

In September 2003, a six-person team from the United Nations found that failure to stop or resolve the killing spree was caused, in part, by insufficient financial and professional resources among federal and state investigators, and inattention by government officials. In response, the Mexican government stated that they have not solicited, nor do they need, the help of the United Nations, a defensive response that is typical of officials who are often more concerned about their image than making any genuine progress in the series of femicides.

U.S. Congressional Pressure
In October 2003, a U.S. congressional delegation lead by Hilda Solis (D-CA) visited Ciudad Juarez. The Mexico Solidarity Network, the Latin American Working Group (LAWG), and the Washington office on Latin America (WOLA) organized the three-day delegation. Ester Cano Chavez, director of Casa Amiga, a rape crisis center in Ciudad Juarez, told a reporter from Women's E News that she, "never imagined" the amount of media attention generated by the visit of the U.S. congressional delegation. " I think it caused a sensation… and it will help us in our fight."

In the following month, Solis spearheaded House Resolution 466 condemning the murders and calling for U.S. Government action. Co-introducing the resolution were: Louise Slaughter (D-NY), Shelly Moore Capito (R-WV), Silvestre Reyes (D-TX), Ciro Rodriguez (D-TX), Jim Ramstad (R-MN), Christopher Shays (R-CT), Martin Sabo (D-MN), and Luis Gutierrez (D-IL). The resolution currently has 136 co-sponsors in the House. Senate Resolution 392, identical to the house resolution, was introduced in June 2004 by Senators Jeff Bingaman (D-NM), Kay Bailey Hutchison (R-TX), and Mary Landrieu (D-LA), and currently has 10 co-sponsors.

A month later, Norma Andrade, the mother of Juarez victim Lilia Alejandra Garcia Andrade, visited Washington, DC, to give testimony before the US Congress. She accused Chihuahua State Governor Patricio Martinez of threatening affected families because they are seeking help from international agencies. Andrade told reporters that police lied to her about the forensic details in her daughter's case. Adding insult to her suffering, Mexican officials wouldn't allow her to adopt the children of her murdered daughter, ruling her unfit as a parent because of "psychological damage." Increasing U.S. Congressional concern about the femicides has strengthened the position of families and human rights workers in the state of Chihuahua.

Minimizing the Problem
The day after the U.S. congressional delegation visited Juarez, Michaela Felix Alvarado was found dead. Ester Cano Chavez told reporters that authorities attempted to diminish the importance of the case, saying that Felix was a drug addict, and that this was probably a case of domestic violence, and thus less important than a murder fitting the characteristics of a serial killing, a position that outrages human rights workers. Lucha Castro of Justicia Para Nuestras Hijas says that classifying domestic violence-related murders as less important than serial murders is a tactic that the authorities use to minimize the problem:

Manipulation of the figures is also a move on the part of the attorney general's office to minimize the problem, suggesting that in reality there have only been 90 murders. We reject the classification of the crimes in this way. In the end these were women whose lives were taken away, who were victims of sexual violence and who were murdered. Some of the murders seem to be serial killings, and others are related to domestic violence. It seems that the only ones considered important are the serial killings, and no importance is given to domestic violence. For us, both are equally monstrous.

By grouping domestic violence-related murders separately, authorities attempt to maintain the appearance of fewer murders, and thus minimize the appearance of more interconnected and extensive criminal activity. But the distinction quickly falls apart when one recognizes that the unsolved serial murders provide a sort of cover for husbands or boyfriends who threaten their partners. In the heat of arguments with domestic partners, many women report hearing some variation of "do what I say or you'll end up dumped in the cotton field" (a reference to the site where eight bodies were found in Juarez).

Human rights workers and government officials disagree over the number femicides, as well as the number of women who are missing. Authorities currently recognize only 328 femicides, while NGOs estimate the number at close to 400. The number of disappeared may be in the thousands. The discrepancies are partly explained by the fact that Mexican officials refuse to include femicides that occur in Chihuahua City, focusing only on those that occur in Ciudad Juarez. The recent report by Special Procesuter Lopez Urbina is an example of how authorities attempt to treat the cases in isolation (more on the special prosecutor below).

Mexican Governmental Response: Fall 2003 to Spring 2004
As the femicides continue and the issue gains international attention, government officials have begun to address the serious problem of faulty investigations. On October 7, 2003, the Senate formed a commission to oversee the investigations. The commission included: Dulce Maria Sauri, Martha Tamayo, Lucero Saldana and Doroteo Zapata of the PRI, Luisa Maria Calderon, Micaela Aguilar and Jesus Galvan of the PAN, and Leticia Burgos and Maricarmen Ramirez of the PRD, plus Sara Castellanos of the Green Party.

In October of 2003, following close on the heals of the Amnesty International report, President Vincente Fox created a new federal office to prevent and investigate the murders. He appointed Guadalupe Morfin Otero as Special Federal Commissioner on Violence against Women in Ciudad Juarez. Her office is in charge of mandating federal programs to prevent and investigate violence against women, which are outlined in her "Forty Point Plan." Morfin is in charge of coordinating federal programs with state and municipal policies regarding violence against women. Families of victims initially welcomed the commission, but soon found it to be unresponsive and ineffective.

In November 2003, Mexico's National Human Rights Commission released a report accusing Chihuahua investigators of negligence, sloppy work, and inexperience, and listed several problems, including lost documents and the use of torture to obtain confessions. The report focused on Ciudad Juarez to the exclusion of the femicides in Chihuahua City, and found only 263 murders since 1993, in addition to 4,587 missing women. In the cases of missing women, the state Attorney General provided the commission files on only 395 women, indicating that the state in not investigating the majority of disappearances.

In January 2004, Fox named Maria Lopez Urbina as the latest in a series of special prosecutors investigating the murders of women in Juarez and Chihuahua. Her office is under the Federal Attorney General. She is charged with conducting a review of all open cases in Ciudad Juarez and deciding which fall under federal jurisdiction. In cases where the federal government does not have authority, the special prosecutor is charged with suggesting lines of investigation to state authorities. To date, Lopez Urbina's office has assumed jurisdiction over only a handful of cases that deal with federal crimes, leaving the vast majority in the hands of local and state police. Human rights advocates believe that the limited jurisdiction of the special prosecutor's office greatly diminishes the office's effectiveness.

Spring 2004
On Valentine's Day 2004, NGOs and victims' families organized a protest to demand justice in Juarez. Jane Fonda, Sally Field, Christine Lahti, Representatives Hilda Solis (D-CA) and Janice Schakowsky (D-IL), Eve Ensler (author of the Vagina Monologues), and other celebrities joined thousands of protestors in a march starting at the international bridge connecting Ciudad Juarez and El Paso. A coalition of Mexican organizations, including Casa Amiga and the Center for Labor Workshops and Studies (CETLAC), were involved in organizing the Valentine's Day actions, though the U.S. press credited only Amnesty International and the V-Day Foundation, both of whom participated in the protests. Organizers were happy to note that the two new federal officials, Guadalupe Morfin and Maria Lopez Urbina, participated in the march, marking the first time authorities participated in a public event protesting the murders.

Three weeks later, the body of Rebeca Contreras Mancha was found, raped and strangled, in the desert outside of Juarez. Incredibly, the investigation into her case is the first in which the crime scene was preserved, according to human rights workers. In May, the Chihuahua State Attorney General formally charged two narco-traffickers from the Juarez cartel with the rape, torture, and murder of Contreras.

Murders Continue Amid Government and Police Corruption
The corruption of police and government officials in the state of Chihuahua is illustrated by events in the early months of 2004. Chihuahua State Police arrested thirteen agents, issued warrants for three agents and one commander, and fired five commanders in relation to the torture and murder of twelve people whose bodies were discovered buried behind a Juarez home. The officers were members of La Linea, a gang of drug traffickers that include Juarez and Chihuahua State police. Around the same time the Dallas Morning Times quoted a former drug dealer affiliated with La Linea, who claimed that women were raped and killed to celebrate successful drug runs into the US. "Sometimes, when you cross a shipment of drugs to the United States, adrenaline is so high that you want to celebrate by killing women," he claimed.

Just weeks earlier, two young women brought a criminal complaint against a senior law enforcement official in Ciudad Juarez. The official was charged with attempting to form a prostitution ring of under-aged girls. Prosecutors say he took pictures of five adolescent girls to make a catalogue for his clients.

On March 8, Jesus Jose Silva Solis resigned as Attorney General of Chihuahua, accused narco-trafficking. He was replaced by Jesus Antonio Pinon, who had a close working relationship with Silva Solis.

Also in March, a prosecutor for the State of Chihuahua issued arrest warrants for Juarez social justice activists Lucha Castro and Gabino Gomez, accusing them of a series of felonies. This was part of an ongoing campaign against activist demanding justice in Chihuahua. Activists charge that authorities spend more time intimidating the families of victims and their allies than solving the murder cases.

On April 1, 2004, the United Nations released a report condemning Chihuahua authorities for improperly handling the Juarez femicide cases, claiming investigations are tainted by corruption. In particular, the report condemned the obstruction and slow pace of investigations, and the falsification of evidence. The report also condemned the harassment of victims' families, and the use of torture to obtain confessions. The committee recommended the Mexican government sign a protocol with the U.S. to carry out a joint investigation.

Murders of women continued into the summer of 2004. In August, police identified the body of Alma Brisa Molina, a 34-year-old maquiladora worker. Authorities claimed this was the first murder involving sexual assault in the past 15 months, a position that was quickly discredited by activists and women's organizations.

First Reports by the Special Prosecutor and Special Commissioner
In June 2004, Special Prosecutor Maria Lopez Urbina and Special Federal Commissioner Guadalupe Morfin released their first reports on the Juarez murders. Lopez Urbina's report offered the harshest official assessment to date of state authorities. Lopez Urbina charged 81 police officials with negligent or incompetent investigative work. At least 54, including police investigators, patrol officers and forensics specialists, now face formal investigations. Lopez Urbina's report focused on 50 cases of femicide in Juarez, chosen because they were the first files obtained by hear office. The Special Prosecutor plans to report on about 50 cases every four months, and her next report is due in October 2004. Of the first 50 cases reviewed, she found that most were related to domestic violence. Although many of the suggestions in Lopez Urbina's report are well-researched and clearly necessary, her efforts to treat cases in isolation minimize the appearance of systematic gender violence.

While happy that the report at least takes the crimes seriously, activists in the state of Chihuahua and the international community are not satisfied with Lopez Urbina's work. Human rights advocates criticized the report for its focus on low-level officials, excluding the state attorney general and the governor. The report is considered too little and too late, and revealed no new information not already available in the Amnesty International report released the previous year. And the report does not include murder victims in Chihuahua City, site of a growing number of femicides. This omission is a result of the unfortunate fact that the mandates for both the special commissioner and the special prosecutor are limited to Ciudad Juarez and don't include cases in Chihuahua City.

The report released in June by Special Federal Commissioner Guadalupe Morfin included an evaluation of the federal "Forty Point Plan," and proposed an additional 20 actions, including improved forensic identification of victims and the establishment of a law enforcement agreement between El Paso and Ciudad Juarez in an effort to professionalize Juarez police. Morfin's report offers an analysis of the root causes behind the murders, criticizes state and federal authorities for inaction, and condemns the "blatant complicity" of state institutions, which act on behalf of drug cartels and not the population.

U.S. Citizen Cynthia Kieker
U.S. citizen Cynthia Kieker and her husband, Ulises Perzebal, were arrested in May 2003, and charged with the murder of 16-year-old Viviana Rayas. The couple has been incarcerated ever since and tortured into making confessions, which they later retracted. The couple also claims that their lawyers have been threatened. One of their lawyers, Chihuahua resident Miguel Zapien, was recently attacked by an unknown assailant. The arrests of Kiecker and Perzebal are part of an alarming trend in which local authorities appear to be targeting "counter-culture types." This serves two purposes: first, it gives the appearance that authorities are actively investigating the crimes, and, second, officials are able to arrest relatively powerless people who are out of the mainstream and generate little public sympathy with claims of torture.

In June 2004, President Fox visited Kieker's home state of Minnesota, assuring US Senator Norm Coleman that Kieker would be released soon. As of September 2004, Kieker remains in jail, and Fox's office now claims he mis-spoke. The parents of the young victim, Viviana Rayas, believe that Kieker and Perzebal are innocent, and have publicly denounced the investigation, saying officials are using the couple as scapegoats.

Government Compensation for Victims Families
In late August 2004, the federal government announced an assistance program for the families of women killed in Ciudad Juarez. Thirty mothers, selected from a group of 47 families whose daughter's cases, according to officials, fit the serial rape/murder profile, will receive houses on September 6th. The remaining 17 families are scheduled to receive housing by the end of the year. The houses will be located in a remote desert area on the outskirts of Juarez. Members of this group also receive monthly grants of 1,800 pesos, in addition to psychological counseling. Many families of victims have refused government compensation. A recent report by the Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs addressed this refusal:

Thirty mothers of victims of sexual assault are receiving support while still residing in Ciudad Juarez. The location of the remaining mothers is unknown or they have refused support and created their own organizations to demand a solution of the issue and to make people aware of the problem."

Special Federal Commissioner Guadalupe Morfin manages the assistance program. Many families wonder why she is administering assistance programs with obvious propaganda value rather than solving the femicides. The program appears to be a blatant attempt to buy the silence of mothers who have been outspoken critics of government inaction.

Conclusion
In the late months of 2004, eleven years after the rash of femicides began in the state of Chihuahua, the families of murdered women and human rights activists still face a long struggle. The past year has seen increasing vigilance on the part of families and activists, complimented by increased international pressure on the government. Official investigations remain corrupt and insufficient, despite the formation of new federal offices and programs, and increased funding. At this point, it is clear that the causes of the murders are multiple. This crisis occurs in a complex social context, involving neoliberal policies, drug trafficking, extreme economic inequality, and corrupt officials. Justice for the families and an end to the femicides will be equally complex.

Bibliography
Authorities Identify Woman Slain in Ciudad Juarez. Associated Press. (July 28, 2004).

Braine, Theresa. "U.S. Reps in Mexico Pressing Murder Investigation." Women's E News: http://womensenews.org/ (October 23, 2003).

Briane, Theresa. "Juarez March Hieghtens Pressue to Solve Murders." Women's E News: http://womensenews.org/ (February 23, 2004).

Bustos, Sergio. Victim's Mother Wants to Push Mexico over Slayings: Ciudad Juarez Resident Meets with Lawmakers, Bush Officials Over Crimes Against Women. Citizen Washington Bureau. December 10, 2003

Castillo, E. Eduardo. "Special Prosecutor Named to Investigate Murders of Women in Mexican Border Town." Associated Press. (January 30th, 2004).

Corchado, Alfredo and Sandoval, Ricardo. "Inquiry Indicates Police, Drug Ties: Disturbing Reports Say Women Were Tortured and Slain as Celebration." Dallas Morning News. (March 1, 2004).

Corchado, Alfredo. "One case of disappearance in Mexico speaks volumes: Man hinted at 'what happened to Neyra' but another man's in jail." Dallas Morning News. (June 30, 2004)

Corchado, Alfredo. "U.S. Officials Push for Closure in Juarez Deaths." Dallas Morning News. (August 29, 2004).

"Crying out for Justice: Murders of Women in Ciudad Juárez, Mexico." Washington Office on Latin America. (October 2003).

Ferris, Susan. Pressure Builds to Solve Murder of 370 Women. Cox News Service. (February 16, 2004).

Hayward, Susana. "Juarez Police Accused of Negligence in Probe of Slain Women." Knight Ridder Newspapers. (November 24, 2003).

"Interview with Lucha Castro and Alma Gomez." Operation Digna. Posted on October 20th, 2003 by Ricardo Dominguez. (http://amsterdam.nettime.org/Lists-Archives/nettime-l-0310/msg00211.html)

"Mothers of Slain Mexican Women Get Compensation." Reuters. (September 1, 2004).

"Mexico Protecting Women Who Accused Border Cop of Sex Crimes." Associated Press. (March 2, 2004).

"Mexico: Intolerable killings - Ten years of abductions and murders in Ciudad Juarez and Chihuahua." An Amnesty International Report. (AI Index: AMR 41/026/2003).

"Mothers of Slain to get Compensation." Rueters. (September 1, 2004)

Rodriguez, Olga. "Hollywood Celebrities Join March to protest Slayings in Ciudad Juarez." Associated Press. (February 14th, 2004).

Vasquez, Barbara. Woman's Body Found Near Site Where Scores of Others Found Earlier. Associated Press. (March 10th, 2004).

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Updated Informative Document Regarding the Mexican Governemts Actions in Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua. Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores. (August 2004). (http://www.sre.gob.mx/substg/derechoshumanos/juarezingles.htm)

Social context - A neoliberal experiment

Introduction
Neoliberalism is the dominant economic, social and political model of our time - the latest phase of capitalism. In the neoliberal era, western-style representative governments have largely abandoned their (at least theoretical) roles as representatives of and mediators among a range of social actors. Joachim Hirsch refers to the "national competitive state" in which government represents the interests of capital at the expense of popular sectors of society. The role of the state is limited to administering poverty and managing social discord so that neither interferes with corporate profits. Disputed social territory - including personal security, public education, social security, public health programs, environmental protection, labor rights, etc. - is increasingly left to "market mechanisms," as the state abandons its role as benefactor (promoter of social programs) and protector of those sectors ravaged by market mechanisms (the homeless, the poor and the unemployed, to name but a few). Neoliberalism is characterized by easy movement of money and goods across borders, but strict control of people (or "labor markets" in the logic of capitalism). The South provides cheap labor, cheap commodities and, increasingly, cheap industrial products for consumers in Europe and North America.

Neoliberalism finds its roots in the so-called Washington consensus, which is nothing more than a class consensus that extends across borders. Conniving governments from the South are often representative democracies, but only in the formal sense of a democracy that can be purchased by local elites and "democracy-building" programs sponsored by the Agency for International Development (note the 2001 elections in Nicaragua as a recent example of this particular distortion of democracy). The governments are in deed representative. The problem is who they represent! Democracy is a principle worth defending and, in fact, worth dieing for. But the "democracy" that is integral to the Washington consensus has very little to do with civil society ordering the affairs of a nation, and everything to do with control of key economic and political decisions by local elites. There are no better examples than the United States and Mexico. In the current constellation of forces, neither president (George W. Bush to the north and Vicente Fox to the south) even won a majority of the vote in their respective elections - not that voting has a whole lot to do with democracy when nearly unlimited money can build a surrealistic view of the most important political issues of the day that often bares little resemblance to reality. In the final analysis, Enron and the oil barons own George Bush, the Monterrey Group owns Vicente Fox, and the rest of us are left with precious little to say about the important affairs of our countries.

While military power is occasionally (and from recent experience, increasingly) necessary to maintain the Washington consensus, economic power exercises day-to-day control. Corporate-centered globalization, the every day operational face of the neoliberal model, is impressive in its reach and level of absolute greed. The neoliberal model has been predominant in this hemisphere for a quarter century (depending on the country in question) and there is sufficient data available for an even-handed evaluation.

Though the elites throughout the hemisphere exercise their influence through the mainstream media to obscure reality with platitudes and slogans in an effort to convince the masses that the neoliberal model is the ONLY and BEST model, the facts speak eloquently. In the 1970's, countries in this hemisphere averaged 4.5% growth in cumulative gross national product. In the 1980's, average growth declined to 3.5%, and in the 1990's average growth declined to 2.5%. (Gross National Product is, at best, an imperfect indicator of improving standards of living - for example, the environmental disaster caused by the grounding of the Exxon Valdez in Alaskan waters added to the GNP of the US for several years because the cleanup generated economic activity. But as a general marker it gives us an idea of where we're headed. And even by neoliberal standards, we appear to be headed in the wrong direction!)

So why is there a Washington consensus if economic growth is actually slowing? The key element here is the understanding of the Washington consensus as a class consensus across borders. While most of us are treading water or getting progressively poorer, the neoliberal model has resulted in an historically unparalleled concentration of wealth and power in the hands of transnational corporations, their shareholders, and the political and technical elites who oversee the system.

Again, the facts speak eloquently. Between 1982 and 1996, real wages in Mexico decreased by an astounding 80%, reversing slightly in the late 1990s, then declining again at the turn of the century, for a cumulative loss of over two-thirds over a period of two decades. In 2004, the minimum wage in Mexico is equivalent to about US$3.96 per day. In a country where prices at WalMart, the largest retailer and employer in Mexico, are typically equal to or higher than WalMart prices in Houston, Mexico's minimum wage doesn't buy much. With the notable exception of rents, prices in Ciudad Juarez are generally higher than prices in El Paso, accounting for the huge influx of Mexican residents across the international bridge each day to do their shopping. Yet Mexico's minimum wage remains among the lowest in the world.

The US working class fares better, but not by much. Between 1970 and 1992, real wages in the US decreased by 19%, even in the midst of what most mainstream economists would consider a period of prosperity. And the poorest half of the population continues to lose ground.

On the other end of the champagne glass (to borrow a common metaphor that portrays the wealthy at the top enjoying oodles of bubbly while the poor share the dregs in the confined neck at the bottom), the rich are doing quite well under the neoliberal model, thank you. In 1997, the richest one-fifth of the world's population owned an astounding 85% of the world's wealth, though this compares favorably with the United States where the wealth of the top 1% of households now exceeds the combined household financial wealth of the bottom 95%. The absolute concentration of wealth and power at the top is unparalleled. The rich are getting richer, the poor are getting poorer, and the illusionary "middle class" is rapidly disappearing. The rich constructed the Washington consensus. The poor majorities are left only with the consensus that neoliberal "adjustments" are always accompanied by "pain," and are nearing a consensus that the pain will be permanent, rather than temporary as neoliberal defenders always promise. Perhaps we should be asking ourselves, first, why do these wonderful programs always involve adjustment pains, and second, why are we always the ones who suffer these pains?

The United States and Mexico have been central to the development of the neoliberal model. We share a 2,000 mile border, the only place in the world where the Global North meets the South. The US-Mexico border is unique, and the relationship between the two nations is equally unique. And within this context, Ciudad Juarez and the state of Chihuahua play a uniquely important role.

In many ways, this geographic marriage represents the most important relationship in the world - a laboratory that is defining the neoliberal model. Three historical markers stand out as central to the development of neoliberalism: the establishment of free trade zones and maquiladoras in 1965, Structural Adjustment Programs initiated by the International Monetary Fund in 1982, and the signing of the North America Free Trade Agreement in 1994.

The US-Mexico relationship has been the proving ground for the practical realities of the Washington consensus: production-for-export replacing production for internal consumption, the use of debt as a lever to force structural adjustment programs, loose investment rules that allow hot money to cross borders in seconds, and a trade agreement (read NAFTA) that is the model for a new legal framework that expands the rights of corporations at the expense of civil society.

Experiments that "work," from the perspective of transnational capital (and all of the above-mentioned experiments "worked") are exported to other countries. This implies a complete restructuring of the economies, politics and cultures around the world, to make them consistent with the neoliberal vision. Nearly everything is on the table for reform: economic policy, public subsidies, social programs, industrial policy, government procurement, intellectual property rights, patents, banking and financial services, agricultural policy, foreign direct investment, energy policy, labor regulations, environmental protection, public education and health care - and the list goes on. Twenty-first century neoliberalism is a project for world domination, and the US and Mexico are at the center of the vortex. And Ciudad Juarez is the most telling result, perhaps offering one possible, and very grim, glimpse of our collective future.

1965 - Free Trade Zones and Maquiladoras
While most observers mark the early 1980s and the Latin American debt crisis as the beginning of neoliberalism, the seeds were firmly planted in 1965 with the establishment of free trade zones and maquiladoras (factories that produce for export) under the Border Industrialization Program (BIP). The BIP represented an important change in the relationship between labor markets and production, moving factories to the source of labor rather than the other way around. Initiated at the end of the Bracero Program (in which Mexico sent cheap labor northward, mainly to harvest fruits and vegetables, under short-term contracts), Mexican politicians hoped the BIP would provide jobs for former Braceros, though ultimately the program, in combination with other neoliberal policies, actually increased immigration from Mexico to the United States, especially undocumented workers.

Foreign production for the United States market certainly existed before 1965, but growth after 1965 was staggering. Total US imports grew from $18.7 billion in 1964 to $1.17 trillion in 2002. In constant 2002 dollars, this represents more than a ten-fold increase. Today about one-third of everything produced in Mexico is exported (an amazing statistic, the implications of which take a moment to fully sink in). Given Mexico's decreasing real wage rates (and decreasing living standards), this means that Mexico's working class is fighting a losing battle, each year paying relatively more, measured in hours worked, for imported goods while selling relatively less in exports.

From the perspective of a traditional capitalist model of development, the BIP marked a clear step backward in the industrialization of Mexico. Production for internal consumption, also known as import substitution, was Mexico's predominant economic model from the 1940s to the mid 1960s, and relied heavily on industrialization led by state intervention. The import substitution model protected strategic industries with tariffs, and required increasing levels of technology and concomitant increasing levels of education among workers.

In contrast, the production-for-export model, of which maquiladoras are the centerpiece, rely on cheap labor and low technologies, and the vast majority of production is exported. It is a model the United States itself pointedly avoided in its own process of industrialization. While there are a number of reasons behind the rapid and successful industrialization of the United States, trade policy has to be considered among the most important. For the better part of two centuries, US trade policy was characterized by high tariffs and other measures that protected young industries from international competition. Since the mid 1960's, the US has taken exactly the opposite position with non-industrialized nations in the South. Rather than encouraging protective trade policies like those that assisted US industry, the new neoliberal mentality calls for open borders and free flows of goods, services and finance. Neoliberal economists are bothered tremendously by anything that gets in the way of the pure functioning of open markets - like the annoying needs of real people in their day-to-day lives. If it weren't for those bothersome people, especially the poor masses with their constant demands for food, housing, education and health care, the neoliberal model could work with scientific precision. That's what the textbooks say! But the real world tells a different story. The results of neoliberalism have been devastating for the poor majorities and working classes in the Mexico and as well as the United States.

Maquiladoras are at the heart of this new model, marking an important political change in Mexico from production for internal consumption to production for export. Maquiladoras often consist of not much more than four walls, a roof, some benches and a few simple tools, hardly the basis for spurring the industrialization of the country as proponents claim. About 98% of the inputs used in maquila production are imported from outside of Mexico. Increasingly these imports come from Southeast Asia, particularly China, where the lowest industrial wages in the world are found. Virtually 100% of maquila production is exported from Mexico, with about 90% destined for the United States. This part of the economic model is enshrined in law, as maquiladoras are prohibited from selling their production in-country. Northern consumers won't have to look far to find maquila-produced goods, from television sets to refrigerators, automobiles to furniture, and textiles to electronic equipment.

The maquiladora model relies on low wages, lax environmental standards, and an "inviting" tax structure, characteristics that are attractive to transnational corporations but ultimately damaging to the majority of Mexicans.

Low wages are key to the "success" of the maquila model. Industrial wages in the US average about $17 per hour, while in 2004, the minimum wage in Ciudad Juarez is 42.23 pesos per day (about US$3.96 at current exchange rates) for an eight-hour day. Maquiladoras typically pay some small multiple of the minimum (see chart 1 below). Some 60% of the Mexican workforce has yearly earnings below the poverty level, defined by the Mexican government as income of less than US$1.90 per day per person in urban areas and US$1.50 per day in the countryside. A family of five would require income equivalent to about three minimum wages, after taxes, to escape the official poverty level (and substantially more to live dignified lives!).

Chart 1: Income distribution of labor force in Ciudad Juarez (Source: INEGI June 2003)
Minimum wage in Ciudad Juarez 45.23 pesos per day (about US$3.96) in 2004
Income (in minimum wages), Percentage, Workers
Less than one, 2.9, 13,552
Between one and two, 34.8, 162,618
Between two and five, 46.1, 215,423
More than five, 11.8, 55,141

Mexico's maquiladora sector suffered dramatic declines from its peak in 2000 (3,703 maquilas) to 3,230 maquilas in July 2003. Job losses totaled about 280,000, a 21% decline, during this period. Total Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the maquila sector declined by about one-third from 2000 to 2003. Declines in employment were most severe in electronics assembly, footwear, textiles and clothing. More sophisticated activities, such as auto parts, remained largely stable, mainly because of the more extensive investment in infrastructure and the need for highly trained workers in this sector.

In Ciudad Juarez, about half of the workforce is occupied in the maquiladora sector. In 2003, Ciudad Juarez had 302 plants employing 195,418 workers, while Chihuahua City had 83 plants employing 43,540 workers (Source: CNIME, C.I.E.S., June 2003). Both figures represent dramatic declines from their peaks in 2000 (see chart 2) and resulted in a tripling of the unemployment rate from 2000 to 2003 (see chart 3). Despite the incredible wealth generated by the maquiladora sector (see chart 2 for value added figures), Mexico does not have unemployment insurance and offers virtually no social safety net for unemployed workers.

Lax environmental regulations attract foreign firms that are tired of seeing their bottom lines affected by bothersome environmental regulations in their home countries. It's part of the eternal struggle of the capitalist to externalize costs and maximize profits. Water, soil and air contamination are often bi-products of industrial production, and in a sane society, the polluter would be responsible for cleanup, with the costs reflected in the price of finished products. But capitalists are always looking for ways to cut corners and force society to pay for some of the costs of production. In maquiladoras along the US-Mexico border, pollution is an endemic problem, as local officials collude with transnational corporations to increase profits (no doubt lining a few political pockets along the way) while environmental quality suffers.

Both low wages and environmental destruction result in social problems. Low wages force workers to choose among various necessities - food, housing, education, health care, transportation. Degradation of the environment affects entire communities, and is especially serious along the border where clean water supplies are limited. (Perhaps this helps to account for the fact that many maquiladora managers live in the US and commute to work.) With all of these problems, government offers the solution of last resort. But maquiladoras pay almost no taxes. Transnational corporations often pit local and state governments against each other in bidding wars to see who will offer the largest tax breaks. In an effort to attract more foreign investment in the maquiladora sector, the Fox administration will phase out payroll taxes in 2004 and most maquiladoras will be exempt from income tax. Without tax income, the state is unable to address the social problems caused by low wages and environmental degradation. Corporations get rich while the communities that host maquilas are degraded - socially, culturally, economically and environmentally.

Members of the ruling class often make the argument that maquiladoras provide jobs, as if a job is a privilege and working people should be thankful for the opportunity to sell themselves for poverty-level wages. The argument is comparable to forcing someone into the desert for three days without water, then wondering why they complain when offered a glass of ice-cold vinegar. The pertinent question is not "Why aren't they thankful for something to drink?" but rather "What are they doing in the desert and where's the water?" In relation to jobs, the pertinent question is not "Why aren't they happy to have jobs?" but rather "Why are these the only jobs available?" and "What are the policies that created this situation in the first place?"

Unemployment and poverty have both increased in Mexico since the late 1960s, and working class wages in the US have been stagnant or falling - even in the midst of the 1990's "economic boom." The neoliberal model leaves most people poorer, and creates a "race to the bottom" as workers and local governments are forced to compete by offering lower wages, lax environmental standards and low taxes.

Chart 2: Unemployment rate in Ciudad Juarez (Source: INEGI)
Year Unemployment rate
1998 1.0
1999 0.8
2000 0.7
2001 1.6
2002 2.9
2003 2.7

Chart 3: Maquiladoras in Ciudad Juarez (Sources: INEGI, CNIME, CIES Jan 2004)
Year Number of plants Number of employees (annual average) Payroll and benefits (millions of dollars) Value added (millions of dollars) Imported supplies (millions of dollars)
1987 240 98,850 253 - -
1988 254 118,112 357 - -
1989 248 110,999 474 894 2,442
1990 290 128,829 542 987 2,625
1991 255 123,888 608 1,098 3,057
1992 267 128,901 732 1,233 3,760
1993 254 132,089 811 1,254 4,470
1994 232 140,097 910 1,471 4,748
1995 237 155,421 698 1,276 5,320
1996 264 172,926 826 1,476 6,642
1997 283 190,506 852 1,552 5,520
1998 258 206,623 - 2,077 -
1999 297 222,866 953 2,580 10,713
2000 308 249,509 706 3,040 11,728
2001 306 207,087 2,094 3,619 11,780
2002 305 192,485 1,974 3,584 11,779
2003* 265 200,183 1,409 2,722 9,926
* Jan to Oct 2003

Early 1980s - Structural Adjustment Programs
In 1970, Mexico's foreign debt totaled US$3.2 billion. In the early 1980s, foreign debt reached US$100 billion. A full explanation of this dramatic increase is beyond the scope of this brief investigation. Suffice it to say that international lending institutions, in particular the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, paved the way with official stamps of approval, and the Mexican ruling class and US investors profited handsomely. But most Mexican workers suffered, to the point where the 80s is known as the "lost decade." While many Latin American countries found themselves in serious debt in the early 1980's, Mexico was the first to confront possible default.

In many ways this was a godsend for the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The IMF was founded in 1944, along with the World Bank, at a conference of over 40 countries, most of them aligned with the soon-to-be-victorious "Allies" in World War II. The goal was to prevent another economic cataclysm like the Great Depression of the 1930s, which was widely blamed for fuelling the rise of fascism in Europe. The IMF's original task was to monitor currency values and help member countries maintain their balance of trade by making small short-term loans. This role became obsolete in 1973 when the U.S. ended the "dollar-gold" standard (in which it guaranteed to redeem $35 with an ounce of gold, and all other currencies were pegged to the dollar).

While nominally a special organ of the United Nations, functionally the IMF is controlled by a few capital-exporting countries, with the United States taking the leading role. This occurs because votes on the governing board are determined neither by population nor by one-country-one-vote, but rather by the monetary contribution each country makes to the institution. The United States controls about 18% of the votes (double the power of the next-largest contributor, Japan) and wields effective veto power over all IMF decisions. In effect, the US Treasury Department sets IMF policy.

The IMF foundered in the mid-1970s, performing an annual analysis of each member country's economy, but doing little else. It carved out a new role for itself with the advent of the Latin American debt crisis in the early 1980s. When Mexico came close to defaulting on debt payments, the IMF answered the panicked calls of large private banks and wealthy member governments by assembling a "rescue" package of loans accompanied by a large number of conditions (called "conditionalities" or Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) in IMF parlance), ostensibly to prevent future debt problems and to restore the Mexican economy to health. These conditions included measures to open the economy to foreign corporations, eliminate trade barriers, restrict access to credit, and cut social spending. Although Mexico was not the first country to receive an IMF "policy-based loan," it was here that the IMF first imposed a comprehensive macroeconomic program via structural adjustment.

Mexico's loans became the standard for SAPs that the IMF went on to impose in over 80 countries during the 1980s and 1990s. The psychological barrier that prevented the IMF from assuming virtual control of a country's economic policy was broken in Mexico. Full-scale threats to the global economy, such as the Latin American debt crisis, were no longer required for the IMF to use the leverage of debt problems to re-order national economic policy. As the march of structural adjustment continued across Latin America, the Caribbean, Africa, and much of Asia, economic policy began to assume a homogenous character throughout the South. No longer were experiments with "socialism" or "import substitution" tolerated. Free trade, privatization, low-wage labor in assembly factories, and export-led economies - in other words, neoliberal policies - became the global rule.

Today Mexico exports fully one-third of everything produced within the borders of the country. Almost 90% of these exports are destined for the United States. The maquiladora sector represents an important part of these exports, but the majority of the exports (and this is true for Latin America as a whole) are raw materials. In the case of Mexico, oil is king, with minerals and "designer vegetables" (broccoli, cauliflower, asparagus, etc.) also important. Water and hydroelectric power from southern Mexico may prove to be the most important exports of the 21st century (see President Fox's Plan Puebla Panama for examples of this). Cheap labor in the form of undocumented workers is also a key "export." Family remittances from migrant workers represent Mexico's second most important source of hard currency, reaching about US$12 billion in 2003. We will see later how neoliberal policies affect labor markets.

1994 - NAFTA
From the perspective of the ruling class, the North America Free Trade Accord (NAFTA), signed on January 1, 1994, is the defining legal structure for future United States economic relations with the rest of Latin America. NAFTA integrates the economies of Mexico, the United States and Canada by eliminating most trade and investment controls over a 10-year period, with some agricultural tariffs phased out over 15 years. NAFTA builds on the US-Canada Free Trade Agreement signed in 1988.

· NAFTA provides for the strongest intellectual property rights (patents, copyrights, and trademarks) in any bilateral or international agreement. This is particularly favorable for US-based high tech, pharmaceutical and entertainment companies.

· Prior to NAFTA, Mexico could review all foreign investment proposals to determine if they were in the national interest. NAFTA abolishes this right.

· NAFTA prevents governments at all levels from giving preference to procurement from local suppliers or promoting local-content provisions.

· NAFTA provides for expedited travel visas for businesspersons wishing to travel between the US and Mexico, but makes no provisions for working class people wishing to travel.

· NAFTA eliminates equity and market share restrictions for financial services such as insurance, banking and securities.

· Under Chapter 11 provisions, NAFTA permits investors to sue host governments before secret panels made up of trade experts, who are prohibited from considering national laws or traditions in forming their decisions. Deliberations are carried out in secret and civil society is prohibited from presenting testimony.

· In preparation for signing NAFTA, the US insisted on over 300 changes in Mexico's constitution and legal structure. Perhaps the most significant was the reform of Article 27 of the constitution, ending land distribution to campesinos under the ejido program.

After a decade of NAFTA, the results are obvious - corporations have benefited handsomely while the working class on both sides of the border suffers declining standards of living. NAFTA has been nothing short of a disaster, yet it is proudly trumpeted by the ruling class as the blueprint for the Free Trade Area of the Americas, a proposed trade agreement that would include every nation in the hemisphere except Cuba.

Neoliberal proponents promised that NAFTA would increase trade between the United States and Mexico and would increase foreign investment in Mexico, and this has generally been the case, though with significant deviations dependent largely on business cycles. Net US investment was a negative US$41 billion in 1995 (largely a result of capital flight due to the peso crisis) but the roller coaster turned positive in 1997 and topped out in 2000 at a whopping US$162 billion (much of this due to the purchase of Banamex by Citigroup), only to fall into negative territory again in 2002. Exports to the US increased from US$49.4 billion in 1994 to US$161 billion in 2002. Employment in the maquiladora sector increased from 546,433 in 1994 to 1,291,232 in 2000 (though this number has decreased to near one million since the 2001 recession). But numbers don't tell the whole story. Increasing exports can be good, bad or neutral, depending on the impact on living standards in both countries. Net foreign investment can be good, but it can also increase dollar-denominated debt, forcing nations into a perpetual debt treadmill, and short-term "hot money" investments often do more harm than good. Increases in maquiladora employment must be evaluated by the quality of jobs and the impact on the rest of the economy. A closer look reveals substantial negatives on both sides of the border.

In 2003, Mexico's foreign debt was a whopping US$140 billion, equivalent to 21.6% of total GNP, and interest payments alone amounted to US$37 billion annually. All of this debt is dollar-denominated, putting Mexico on a path of continually increasing exports (with secularly decreasing values) just to service the debt.

In 1992, 64.9% of Mexican families earned the equivalent of four minimum wages or less - not a stellar economy - but the number increased to 65.5% in 2002, the result of a decade of economic "growth" under the neoliberal model.

Foreign investment demands legal structures that insure the "rights" of investors and increasingly these structures are transnational, taking the form of international trade agreements rather than national laws. From the perspective of capital, international agreements offer several advantages. First, they are uniform. Corporate legal experts can deal with one-size-fits-all regulations rather than dealing with a myriad of local and regional regulations designed to meet local and regional needs. Second, capital exercises powerful influence over the design of international regulations (more on this in a moment). Third, international agreements are generally beyond the reach of civil society. For example, NAFTA supersedes national laws, and disputes are settled in secret tribunals. NAFTA and other international agreements even influence over local legislation. When NAFTA tribunals rule against, for example, environmental regulations, they set a precedent that local legislators are bound to follow. Fourth, since international agreements are generally negotiated with the full approval of the United States government, their ultimate enforcement lies with the diplomatic and, if necessary, military power of the United States, generally a powerful incentive to toe the line no matter what the domestic social consequences.

In 2004, the United States is negotiating a plethora of bilateral accords, but the two most important initiatives are the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) and the Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA). Both are based on the NAFTA structure, though both offer transnational corporations additional rights not included in NAFTA. The FTAA would include the entire western hemisphere except Cuba, while CAFTA is limited to Central America and part of the Caribbean. In the late 90s, the FTAA was at the top of the US trade agenda, but with the election of Lula in Brazil and Chavez in Venezuela, plus the Argentina meltdown, it does not appear that the US will successfully conclude the FTAA any time soon. Official attention is now focused on CAFTA, where the US can count on pliable governments throughout the region.

Loss of democracy
In addition to these three central historic moments, other events carry weight in defining the neoliberal model. The 1995 peso crisis generated US$50 billion in emergency loans from the IMF and an additional US$20 billion from the Clinton administration, in exchange for virtual veto power by the US Treasury over Mexico's economic decisions for the next decade. This is characteristic of perhaps the most profound and important element of neoliberalism - the usurpation of democracy - a characteristic that cuts across nearly every element of the neoliberal model. Increasingly, transnational corporations and the political powers that defend their interests are gaining power at the expense of civil society, which often spent generations of struggle to win rights and protections. The loss of democracy is not an abstract, academic question. It is having a serious impact on the ability of people to control their lives and the future of their communities. The loss of democracy will have consequences for generations to come.

IMF Structural Adjustment Programs are one of the best examples. The US Treasury Department, in the form of the IMF, is writing economic policy for countries around the world, using foreign debt as leverage to force Southern nations to adopt neoliberal policies. It should be noted that ruling elites in the South, the new "technocrats," many of whom received training at US universities, are generally in agreement with these neoliberal initiatives. After all, they gain almost as much under the neoliberal model as their US counterparts. However, local elites do not enjoy sufficient popular support to initiate neoliberal policies without the "cover" offered by the IMF. The fact that the IMF "forces" these elites to accept these policies is a direct appropriation of democracy.

The Chapter 11 provisions of NAFTA that allow corporations to sue governments before secret tribunals are another direct threat to democracy. This legal instrument is relatively new, and in the case of Mexico and the United States, it is the first time that either country has agreed to participate in such a dispute settlement mechanism. Although Chapter 11 has only been in effect for ten years, and corporate legal counsels only recently began to experiment seriously with the mechanism, there are already several cases that are indicative of the dramatic loss of democracy.

· In January 1997, Metalclad Corporation of Newport Beach, California, filed a complaint under NAFTA alleging that the state of San Luis Potosí violated NAFTA provisions when it prevented the company from expanding a waste disposal plant. In 1991 Metalclad purchased the facility, which had a history of contaminating local groundwater, with the obligation to clean up pre-existing contaminants. After an environmental impact assessment revealed that the site lies atop an ecologically sensitive underground stream, the Governor refused to allow Metalclad to reopen the facility. Eventually, the Governor declared the site part of a 600,000 acre ecological zone. Although Metalclad never received the necessary local permits, the company claims this action was effectively an expropriation. In August of 2000, a secret NAFTA tribunal awarded Metalclad $16.7 million in damages. Apparently the private profits of Metalclad are more important than protection of the community's groundwater.

· In April 1997, Canada imposed a ban on the gasoline additive MMT. Some US states also ban MMT, whose primary ingredient, manganese, is a known human neurotoxin. Ethyl Corporation, the main producer of MMT, responded to Canada's public health law with a $250 million lawsuit, claiming the law violated its investor protections under NAFTA. Ethyl argued that the law was an "expropriation" of its assets because it would eliminate expected profits from Canadian sales of the additive. The Canadian government settled the suit, agreeing to pay Ethyl $13 million in damages and cover the company's legal costs. It also proclaimed publicly that MMT is "safe" - contradicting the position of its national environmental protection agency.

· The Methanex Corporation of Vancouver produces MTBE, an oxidant used as a gasoline additive to improve combustion efficiency. MTBE is highly carcinogenic, and for several years has been contaminating California groundwater. The California Assembly passed a law prohibiting the use of MTBE, a reasonable response to extensive drinking water contamination by a known carcinogen. Methanex sued the State of California for $970 million, for the loss of potential profits from possible future sales of MTBE in California. As of this writing, the case is still pending, complicated by the fact that former Goveror Grey Davis apparently accepted substantial campaign contributions from the ethanol lobby, Methanex's main competitor. If decided in favor of Methanex, it likely be interpreted as open season for corporations to sue for loss of all kinds of "future profits." Even if Methanex loses, local governments will think twice before approving environmental laws that may offend transnational corporations with deep legal pockets.

While the three examples sited above deal with environmental issues, NAFTA rules make almost anything fair game. For example, a city government trying to protect local jobs could be prohibited from offering concessionary loans or preferential purchases to a local company if a transnational corporation wants to compete in the same market. Subsidies (read tax dollars) for public education could be challenged as an unfair business practice if a transnational corporation promoting private schools decides to compete in the same market. The postal system could be threatened as an unfair monopoly, with private companies picking off profitable routes while leaving relatively costly inner city and rural deliveries to the government (this challenge is already being made in Canada by FexEx). NAFTA foretells a world of decreasing public spaces, where private corporations make the vast majority of decisions that affect our lives, not based on a sense of the common good but based solely on the corporate bottom line.

While all of the above-mentioned examples are important, the most significant threat to democracy is also the main constituent of the neoliberal model - the corporation. In an ostensibly democratic country like the United States, it has always amazed this author that large segments of the population are willing to live in virtual dictatorships - called corporations - for one-quarter of their waking hours. No institution present in modern society is less democratic than the corporation. A small cabal of directors and managers exercise virtual dictatorial control over a workforce that, for example in the case of WalMart, numbers in the millions. And this same small group of people decides how to invest and spend billions of dollars in profits that are earned because of the hard work of employees. Not even a hint of democracy to be found, yet the corporation is at the center of modern society, directing production and consumption patterns, use of natural resources, and public policies (via control of the political process through millions of dollars in donations). What could be more Undemocratic!

The neoliberal model expands the power of corporations by removing economic decisions from the political realm. Less government (read less democracy) is the rallying cry, and many people who wait in long lines to get a drivers license, hate to pay income taxes or find today's political class unpalatable agree. But the implication of less democracy is more corporate control, a result that any thinking being would object to in principle and in fact.

The Neoliberal Balance Sheet
Ultimately, we arrive at a very practical question - Does the neoliberal model improve the lives of the majority of the people? This question can be addressed from several perspectives.

From a developmental perspective, the answer is clearly no. The statistics sighted above unequivocally demonstrate that the living standards of the majority of people are declining under neoliberalism. The majority of people in this hemisphere are poorer today than 25 years ago. That's a fact that no amount of propaganda can hide from people who live the reality every day.

From a broader cultural perspective, the neoliberal model has serious implications. It is a hegemonic model that doesn't allow for a variety of cultural expressions. Neoliberalism is based on certain fundamental values that are inconsistent at best, and diametrically opposed at worst, to cultural values that are alive and well in many parts of Mexico and the United States. Neoliberalism is based on individualism, consumerism, concentration of capital, and centralization of power. In stark opposition we find community-based models in Mexico and the United States that are based on collectivism, environmentalism, equitable distribution of wealth, and democracy. Perhaps the best known example is the Zapatista struggle for autonomy. The Cuban health care system, the indigenous uprising in Ecuador, student movements, ejidos (communally owned agricultural lands in Mexico), cooperatives, the international environmental movement, and the citizen's movement in Argentina are but a few examples of alternatives in this hemisphere. These competing visions are locked in profound struggles throughout the world, but no more so than in Mexico, especially along the US-Mexico border.

Next we'll take a look at Mexico's mounting rural crisis, the direct result of three decades of neoliberal policies. The rural crisis has had a particularly profound affect in the state of Chihuahua.

Neoliberalism and Mexico's Rural Crisis
Mexico's rural crisis dates to the late 1970s, when PRI administrations began to implement neoliberal policies, cutting agricultural subsidies and assistance programs, especially for small and medium sized producers. With the implementation of NAFTA, small and medium sized agricultural producers were unable to compete directly with highly subsidized and mechanized US producers and transnational corporations that exercise effective monopoly control over international grain markets. Since 1994, real prices for Mexican corn have fallen more than 70% because of massive, low-priced US imports, effectively destroying the internal market for native producers. Mexico's protective tariffs on corn, beans and milk are scheduled to end in 2008, while in January 2003, NAFTA ended most other agricultural tariffs, threatening the livelihoods of one-quarter of the population.

The roots of the rural crisis are found in the structural mechanisms that capital uses to appropriate surplus value from the campesino class in the neoliberal era - the vicious circle of corporate subsidies, free trade regimes, monopoly markets and vertically integrated corporate structures. For purposes of analysis, we can enter the circle at any point. As a matter of convenience, we will begin our analysis with corporate control of international grain markets, in particular corn. Corn production is at the heart of Mexico's rural economy. About three million family units, or about 18 million people, almost one-fifth of the population, produce corn. About 60% of Mexico's agricultural land is planted in corn. Neoliberal policies that impact corn production have ramifications throughout the economy and society.

According to the Unites Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), "as of 1997, world agricultural trade still accounted for as much as 11% of world merchandise trade, and remained ahead of other sectors such as automotive products, textiles and clothing, chemicals, fuels or iron and steel" giving some indication of the importance of agriculture to the world economy. Ten transnational corporations control 32% of the world's total agricultural market, exercising sufficient control to declare the market an effective monopoly. The corn market is even more concentrated. The United States produces 39% of the world's corn, and in 2001, three firms controlled more than 80% of US corn exports: Cargill, Archer Daniel Midland (ADM) and Zen Noh. Cargill alone is responsible for about 42% of US corn exports.

Cargill describes itself as an "international marketer, processor and distributor of agricultural, food, financial and industrial products and services with 97,000 employees in 59 countries." Note that Cargill does not actually produce corn or other agricultural products, but the corporation exercises effective control via production contracts that specify seeds, fertilizer, pesticides, herbicides, etc, all marketed by the contracting company. Production of basic grains is one stage in a vertically integrated process in which every step - production, transportation, processing, marketing and export - is under corporate control. Vertical integration means that profits in one transaction can offset losses in another, giving corporations huge advantages in negotiations with producers and buyers.

In addition to monopoly control and vertical integration, Cargill and other US corporations are able to dominate the international corn market because of extensive state subsidies that allowed US exporters to dump corn in Mexico in 2001 at 33% below the actual cost of production. In May 2002, President Bush increased state agricultural spending by 80% over the watershed 1996 Freedom to Farm Act. According to Food First, "Today more than 40 percent of net farm income comes from the federal government. … The top 10 percent of farm-subsidy recipients collect two-thirds of the money, [while] the bottom 80 percent get just one-sixth." We're not talking here about the mythical family farm. Large corporate producers account for most basic grain production. Increasingly the family farmer is converted into a sub-contractor representing little more than cheap labor for corporate farming operations.

Corporate producers are not the only recipients of government largesse. According to President Bush, "Today, 25 percent of U.S. farm income is generated by exports." Under the 2002 Farm Bill Market Access Program, a total of $100 million has already been distributed to 67 U.S. trade groups for the purpose of promoting U.S. agricultural products in overseas markets. An additional $1.34 million in federal funds from the Quality Samples Program has been allocated to 17 trade groups to increase export sales by expanding into new agricultural markets.

Extensive government subsidies have two immediate results. First, Cargill and other exporters can purchase, and sell, basic grains below the cost of production, driving many foreign producers, especially small producers, out of business. Second, subsidies promote overproduction, flooding the market and undercutting prices further.

Overproduction is one of the fundamental goals of subsidy programs, and outside the context of a capitalist economy, it makes sense. Food is not like automobiles, cosmetics, refrigerators or a million other products that consumers can live without for short, or even extended, periods of time. Food must be available every day of the year. Political stability depends, in part, on stable food production. In the context of "free markets" and transnational production, food sovereignty is one of the most discussed topics of the 21st century, specifically because of the importance of food for political stability. US subsidy programs promote US production at the expense of production in other countries, to the extent that food becomes useful as a strategic weapon in international disputes.

Corn is not the only agricultural commodity affected by low prices, over production and monopoly markets. The international coffee market is another example of neoliberalism at work. Corporations that control the international coffee market are quite profitable. In fact, retail coffee prices are increasing in recent years, even as wholesale prices decline to 45 cents a pound, well below the cost of production. Coffee is not produced in the United States, but rather in the global South, accounting in large part for the lack of subsidies, price support and political clout of producers. While the World Bank has seen fit to stimulate production over the past decade with extensive low interest loans, particularly to Vietnam, it has not seen fit to defend market prices. The result is hundreds of thousands of coffee producers searching for alternative means to survive.

Even if formal US government subsidies for basic grains were to end tomorrow, highly mechanized corporate producers would still enjoy "unaccounted" subsidies paid by the world's population in the form of environmental damage caused by extensive use of fossil fuels, pesticides, herbicides, and chemical fertilizers. The environmental damage is genuine and extensive, yet the cost of repair never shows up in the price of the agricultural products. Rather, the costs are "externalized," eventually to be assumed by society at large.

Michael Pollan outlines the extent of environmental damage in one sector of US agricultural production, cattle ranching, which is closely linked to corn production: "Growing the vast quantities of corn used to feed livestock in this country takes vast quantities of chemical fertilizer, which in turn takes vast quantities of oil - 1.2 gallons for every bushel." According to Pollan, US corn production is "an 80-million-acre monoculture that consumes more chemical herbicide and fertilizer than any other crop. Keep going and you can trace the nitrogen runoff from that crop all the way down the Mississippi into the Gulf of Mexico, where it has created (if that is the right word) a 12,000-square-mile 'dead zone'." Pollan notes another unaccounted cost: "corn constitutes … an important link in [the] food chain, … [part] of an industrial system powered by fossil fuel. (And in turn, defended by the military - another uncounted cost of 'cheap' food.)" Given the environmental attitudes exhibited by US leadership in the recent death of the Kyoto Accords, this unaccounted "subsidy" will most likely continue for the foreseeable future. In effect, environmentally sound producers, ie, Mexican campesinos, are providing a subsidy by producing grains at the margin using techniques that do not damage the environment to nearly the extent of mechanized production. The corporate model is clearly unsustainable in the long term. Water and soil contamination and extensive use of non-renewable fossil fuels cannot continue forever. Some future generation will have to pay the price. Rather than being rewarded, campesinos are actually penalized for their sustainable practices in the "logic" of the market.

Impact in Mexico
For the past two decades, Mexico's neoliberal policies followed the "free market" model (dictated by the IMF and World Bank) by largely ending subsidies for grain production, especially corn. Under NAFTA, protective tariffs on corn are scheduled to end in 2008. Even before tariffs are eliminated, corn prices fell by 48% between January 1994 and August 1996 as imports from the United States increased dramatically, undercutting the national market and forcing many small and medium sized producers to look for other sources of income.

Many campesino producers grow corn both for auto-consumption and for local markets, offering a source of income for products that campesino families are unable to produce themselves, for example, school supplies, tools, cookware, medicines, etc. By undercutting prices in local markets, campesinos are forced to look elsewhere for a source of income, while continuing to produce for auto-consumption. (According to Arturo Leon, Mexican lands dedicated to corn production have actually increased in the past two decades, while corn imports from the US are also increasing at staggering rates. Demographic factors cannot account for both increases, and presumably the vast majority of increased campesino production is for auto-consumption and is, to some extent, replacing more expensive nutritional sources such as animal protein.) In the context of neoliberal capitalism, migration to large cities, border maquiladoras or, increasingly, the United States often offers the only available alternative. Displaced rural dwellers from central and southern Mexico are converted into the maquiladora workforce, a process known as proletarianization.

The decision to migrate is generally a family decision and often this means splitting up the family unit for extended periods of time. Maquiladoras often prefer young female workers, for their reputed hand dexterity and because they are generally seen as less demanding than male workers. For families contemplating migration as a survival strategy, this means that young women are often sent to the border region to search for work in maquiladoras.
In Ciudad Juarez more than 60% of the maquiladora workforce is women, and most of them are migrant workers. In 2001, 41.1% of population of Ciudad Juarez was immigrants, and the percentage grows every year (INEGI 2001). Ciudad Juarez registered an annual growth rate of 4.35% from 1990-2000, by far the fastest in the state. Charts 4-6 give an idea of the explosive population growth due to migration in Ciudad Juarez and the state of Chihuahua.

Chart 4: Population growth in Chihuahua since 1960
Year Total population
1960 1,226,793
1970 1,612,525
1980 2,005,477
1990 2,793,537
2000 3,052,907

Chart 5: Population growth in Ciudad Juarez (Source: INEGI 2000)
Year Population
1960 278,995
1970 424,135
1980 567,365
1990 796,499
1994 958,278
1995 1,011,786
2000 1,218,817
2003 1,300,000*

Note: Population estimates for Ciudad Juarez are very likely undercounted due to the difficulty of counting migrant populations. Estimates for 2004 range as high as 1.8 million.

Chart 6: Immigrant population in Ciudad Juarez, 2000 (Source: INEGI 2000)
Origin Population
Durango 156,272
Coahuila 91,742
Zacatecas 53,532
Veracruz 49,550
Federal District 34,070
Other 139,731
TOTAL 524,997

Explosive population growth means two things. First, in combination with meager (and decreasing) tax receipts from the dominant maquiladora sector, city services are severely overburdened. Many migrant workers live in barrios with unpaved roads and without water, sewer or electricity. Newly arrived migrants are often forced to live in cardboard shacks located long distances from the maquiladora industrial parks. It is not uncommon for maquiladora workers to travel two hours or more on uncertain public transportation to reach their workplace.

Second, constant migration means a huge unemployed reserve workforce that forces down wages. Turnover rates in the maquiladora sector are extremely high as workers constantly search for better and safer working conditions.

Today Ciudad Juarez boasts the largest maquiladora sector in Mexico. Over 300 plants employ nearly 200,000 workers. Tijuana is a distant second, with the maquiladora sector employing 138,241 workers, while employment in Reynosa is 71,167 and in Nuevo Laredo it's 17, 997. Tijuana enjoys easy access to California and the rest of the west coast of the United States, Reynosa and Nuevo Laredo are closer to Houston, San Antonio and the US east coast, while Ciudad Juarez is across the border from El Paso and separated by hundreds of miles of desert and mountains from other US population centers. So why did the maquiladora sector explode in Ciudad Juarez more so than other border cities? Most likely this is due to the historic lack of unions in Chihuahua state. Even today, Delphi, which produces auto parts and is the largest employer in Ciudad Juarez, does not have a union in any of its plants.

Femicides in context
The decade-long series of femicides occurs in the context of a neoliberal experiment that is out of control. Ciudad Juarez and Chihuahua City are the leading edge of 21st century frontier capitalism, part of the race to the bottom that is enveloping ever-larger parts of the world. Young women are little more than replaceable cogs in a profit-driven machine that values neither life nor dignity. Constant migration from southern Mexico provides a reserve workforce that keeps wages low and living conditions below poverty level. The constant influx of new workers puts women in competition with men for scarce jobs, a situation that is not well-received in a traditionally macho society. And the state is unable to develop solutions because of lack of resources.

You need not look far in your own community to find the beginnings of the same race to the bottom - decreasing education budgets, increased unemployment, declining standards of living, less access to health care, and, most importantly, less democracy. The race to the bottom tears apart the cultural fabric, tears apart community, resulting in a situation where femicide takes its place among a number of pressing social problems. And given the historic position of women in male-dominated societies, femicide does not make it anywhere near the top of the list.

The Corrupting Influence of Narco-Dollars

The US Perspective
By any measure, illegal drugs have a huge economic impact and take a devastating toll on society, both north and south of the border. In the United States, the street value of illegal drugs sold during 2000 was estimated at more than $62 billion and illegal drugs cost society an estimated $118 billion annually in lost work, crime, law enforcement and medical expenses, according to the Office of National Drug Control Policy estimated (some NGOs place societal costs as high as $500 billion annually). By far the most popular, destructive and profitable drug is cocaine. US Customs estimated that $30 billion from drug proceeds were smuggled into Mexico during FY1999, the majority from cocaine sales. According to the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA):

The Southwest Border is the most prominent gateway for drugs into the United States. … The international bridges and the large transportation industry available in this area provide drug traffickers with innumerable drug and money smuggling opportunities. The desert-like areas in New Mexico and West Texas and easily crossed sections of the Rio Grande offer tremendous smuggling opportunities to drug trafficking organizations. … Cocaine smuggling is our most serious regional threat. … Mexican drug trafficking organizations utilize the El Paso ports of entry as their primary conduit into the U.S. … Three major Mexican drug trafficking organizations are responsible for smuggling illegal drugs across the West Texas and New Mexico area of the Southwest Border. Although these organizations are in agreement to work together without trying to control each other, recently one of the leaders has been consolidating his power, to demonstrate that he is still in charge of the El Paso/Juarez corridor. His methods include violence and executions of smaller organizations that do not pay his "fees" to move their drug shipments through "his" corridor. For example, in the last eight years, there have been 325 drug-related executions in this corridor. (DEA Congressional Testimony, April 15, 2003)

A report from the US State Department sheds further light on the problem:
Mexico … produce[d] about one-third of the heroin consumed in the United States and exported about 5,000 metric tons of marijuana to the United States… Mexico is the principal transit country for South American cocaine entering the United States; an estimated 70 percent of the U.S.-bound cocaine shipments pass through its territory (US Dept of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2003 - Mexico).

From the US perspective, illegal drugs result in increased crime by users in search of money to feed their addictions and high murder rates in inner city areas where gangs battle for turf and markets. Drug use is viewed as a criminal activity rather than a health problem. The solution of choice is interdiction at the border and incarceration of drug addicts and dealers. The federal government spent $19.2 billion on drug control programs in 2003, of which two-thirds went to interdiction and law enforcement, according to the National Drug Control Strategy FY2003 Budget. About 60% of US prisoners are in jail for drug-related offenses.

In the US context, the corrupting influence of drug money is generally seen as an isolated problem without serious or continuing implications. This is a popular myth belied by the regular arrest and conviction of law enforcement agents, from both border areas and interior cities, for their direct involvement in the illegal drug trade. The popular myth would have us believe that drug cartels exist in Mexico but somehow don't accompany the drugs across the border, an astonishing argument contradicted by a 1998 report from the General Accounting Office (GOA), which cites examples of publicly disclosed drug-related police corruption in Atlanta, Chicago, Cleveland, Detroit, Los Angeles, Miami, New Orleans, New York, Philadelphia, Savannah, and Washington, DC - and this list is by no means exhaustive. Half of all police officers convicted as a result of FBI-led corruption cases between 1993 and 1997 were convicted for drug-related offenses, according to the GOA report.

Corruption reaches to the highest levels of the US government, with the Iran-Contra affair perhaps the most publicly known, though certainly not the only, example. The Senate Committee Report on Drugs, Law Enforcement and Foreign Policy, also known as the Kerry Commission Report, found "payments to drug traffickers by the U.S. State Department of funds authorized by the Congress for humanitarian assistance to the Contras, in some cases after the traffickers had been indicted by federal law enforcement agencies on drug charges, in others while traffickers were under active investigation by these same agencies."

Corruption is not limited to the government. About $500 billion - including drug-related profits and other illegally obtained money - is laundered through US banks each year, according to the Bureau of National Affairs. Four of the largest banks in the United States - Citibank, J.P. Morgan, Bank of America and First Union - are among the worldwide leaders in money laundering, according to a March 2001 Congressional report.

While we could spend many more pages discussing drug-related corruption in the United States, the major focus of this paper is narco-corruption south of the border. We note the previous statistics in an effort to dispel a commonly held myth concerning drug cartels in the United States, and we will return to these arguments later during the discussion of policy options.

The Mexican Perspective
Mexico is a country of drug transit. As noted earlier, about 70% of all cocaine that enters the United States passes through Mexico. From the Mexican perspective, two facts are of consummate importance in understanding the situation, especially in Juarez, which is the center of drug transit to the United States. First, drug trafficking at the border is driven by demand in the United States, and second, the corrupting influence of narco-dollars reaches the highest levels of the Mexican government and often leaves narco-traffickers immune from prosecution. Neither of these issues is seriously addressed in DEA or State Department reports, especially reports produced under the Bush administration. While the corrupting influence of narco-dollars generally receives passing notice, Bush administration officials appear more interested in downplaying these problems in an effort to curry favor with the Fox administration. In the context of an international diplomatic disaster associated with the war in Iraq, the Bush administration can't afford to alienate any more allies.

Narco-corruption affects virtually every level of the Mexican government, and is particularly prevalent among security forces and the army. The arrest on February 6, 1997, of Brigadier General Jesus Gutierrez Rebollo, appointed only nine weeks earlier to head Mexico's drug enforcement efforts, shocked the Clinton administration, but surprised few analysts in Mexico. The general was arrested following "secret meetings between Mexican army officers and the country's biggest drug mafia. … [O]fficials say there is growing evidence that military officers discussed a deal to let the drug gang operate in exchange for huge bribes …" (NYT March 26, 1998). Considering the military only entered drug control efforts in a major way in 1996 (with the strong encouragement of the United States) the levels of corruption in the army are remarkable.

The impact of narco-dollars in Mexico is astounding. The cartels spent about 10% of gross income to bribe politicians (according to author Jeff Builta), which would mean bribes in excess of $3 billion annually. Bribery is pervasive throughout Mexico. In the southern state of Quintana Roo, Governor Mario Villanueva and more than 100 other officials were arrested in 1999 for money laundering and protecting cartel members. The current head of the PRI, Roberto Madrazo Pintado, is widely suspected of extensive links to narco-trafficking, though his political power makes him virtually untouchable.

In January 2003, the Federal Attorney General shut down the FEADS offices (Mexico's equivalent of the DEA) throughout the country and held all 200 agents on suspicion of taking bribes from dealers. President Zedillo created FEADS in the wake of the Rebollo scandal as a way of recuperating US confidence in the "war on drugs."

The State Department reported that, "the PGR [Federal Attorney General] levied more than 2,500 sanctions in the first half of 2003, to include 514 suspensions, 395 fines, and 146 firings; some 90 employees faced criminal proceedings, resulting in 15 convictions." The State Department optimistically cites these figures as proof of advances in fighting drug-related corruption, but they can be equally read as a stinging indictment of the ongoing levels of corruption. Do hundreds of arrests each year really mean progress, or are officials corrupted just as fast as they can be replaced? Both the United States and Mexico regularly cite figures "proving progress" in the "drug war," but a look at the broader picture indicates a loosing battle. Even the DEA can't completely hide the pervasive corruption of narco-dollars and maintain their credibility, despite their annual efforts to put a good face on the "drug war" in order to defend ever-increasing budgets. The following is buried deep in a DEA Country Profile Report from 2003:

Violence perpetuated by Mexican drug trafficking organizations persists with relative impunity because of law enforcement corruption, a scarcity of resources to properly investigate these crimes, and a lack of resolve due to the threat of retaliation. (DEA Country Profile for 2003 - Mexico)

Narco-corruption is particularly widespread in Ciudad Juarez. In May 2001, the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, a mission of the United Nations, visited Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua City and Mexico City. His report offers a withering critique of corruption in the Mexican justice system:

During his mission, the Special Rapporteur observed that the process, begun in 1994, towards the establishment of a culture of judicial independence has been slow. Impunity and corruption appear to have continued unabated. Whatever the changes and reforms, they are not seen in reality. Public suspicion, distrust and want of confidence in the institutions of the administration in general and the administration of justice in particular are still apparent. … In general, there is a perception of a high-level of impunity (95 per cent) for all types of crimes. Many crimes are never reported, many arrest warrants are never executed. Part of the problem is also the lack of efficiency of the criminal investigations, with reports indicating that as little as 10 per cent of all criminal files opened lead to charges being made. The level of impunity and corruption in Mexico is a wide societal problem brought on by a political system controlled for nearly a century by a single party that did not need to account for its acts. The situation has been aggravated by the expanding drug trafficking. … At one of the interdepartmental meetings, in response to the Special Rapporteur's observation that the high level of impunity had driven the public to lose confidence in the administration of justice, one interlocutor said "not that the people have lost confidence, they have never had confidence".

The discovery of 12 bodies buried in the yard of a middle class Juarez home in January 2004 prompted Chihuahua officials to issue warrants for 17 state police linked to drug trafficking. The owner of the house implicated other police affiliated with the Vicente Carillo cartel. Although over 300 officers from the Ciudad Juarez police force have been fired in the past year, drug dealers corrupt new officers nearly as soon as they are hired, either with huge bribes, threats or a combination of the two. As a result, the city can't recruit new police and are losing existing officers who are unwilling to risk their lives in the drug war. In addition to the firings, at least 200 officers have resigned or failed to show up for work in 2004 according to a report published in the Dallas Morning News. A recent recruitment drive turned up only fourteen potential new officers, not enough to re-open the state police-training academy, which closed in 2001.

Policy prescriptions
From the Mexican perspective, government corruption is the most debilitating, though certainly not the only, result of illegal drug trafficking. Narco-dollars impact every level of government - police, the judiciary, the army, and local, state and federal officials. The marketing of illegal drugs by multi-national cartels extracts a high social cost. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime describes the problem:

There is a direct link between drugs and an increase in crime and violence. Drug cartels undermine governments and corrupt legitimate businesses. In some countries, addicts supporting their habits commit more than 50 per cent of thefts. Revenues from illicit drugs fund some of the most deadly armed conflicts. The financial toll is staggering. Enormous sums of money are spent every year to strengthen police forces, border patrols, judicial systems and treatment and rehabilitation programmes. The social costs are equally jarring: street violence, gang warfare, fear, urban decay and shattered lives.

In the state of Chihuahua, drug traffickers enjoy a level of impunity paid for with millions of dollars in bribes every year. It may well be the case that many of the unresolved femicides in Chihuahua State are the work of drug dealers. In an interview with the Dallas Morning News, one low level dealer claimed that women are raped and killed to celebrate successful drug runs into the US. "Sometimes, when you cross a shipment of drugs to the United States, adrenaline is so high that you want to celebrate by killing women," he claimed. If this is the case, drug dealers have little to fear in the way of prosecution.

Even if narco-traffickers are not responsible directly for the femicides, their corrupting influence plagues the social fabric with a sense of lawlessness. Violence and impunity influence every element of society, and officials are more likely to view the deaths of a few hundred poor women as a minor problem in this context. Corrupt officials who have already abandoned their public responsibilities under the influence of narco-dollars are just as likely to look the other way in the face of almost any social problem.

Given this grim situation, the solution is surprisingly simple - decriminalization of drugs. Decriminalization would take billions of dollars out of the hands of mafias and drug cartels, ending their corrupting influence. The state would control the sale and distribution of drugs, which could be heavily taxed. Tax income could be used for education and prevention programs, plus health programs for those who do become addicted. Admittedly there might be more drug addicts under this scenario, but in most cases the addictions would be manageable, negating the need for criminal behavior to support expensive habits. And with proper social programs, including jobs programs and education, the level of addictions might even be reduced. In any case, the social costs of drugs would be substantially lower if drugs were controlled by the state and drug addiction was treated as a medical problem rather than a criminal problem. This is true in the US context, but it would have any even more dramatic impact in the Mexican context. But decriminalization must be adopted both south and north of the border. The illegal drug trade is driven by demand in the United States. Decriminalization must begin north of the border in order to starve the criminal cartels of narco-dollars. Decriminalization of drugs would not end the femicides overnight, but it is one necessary step that could begin the repair of a social fabric that has been literally destroyed by the corrupting influence of narco-dollars in the hands of drug cartels.

Bibliography

Komisar, Lucy, 2001, "Shell Game: Citibank attacks money-laundering regulations," In These Times, November.

"National Drug Control Stratefy, FY 2003," The White House, February, 2002.
Cumaraswamy, Dato'Param, 2002, "Independence of the Judiciary, Aministration of Justice, Impunity," UN Economic and Social Council - Commission on Human Rights, January 24.

Drug Enforcement Administration, "Country Profile for 2003 - Mexico."

Corchado, Alfredo and Ricardo Sandoval, 2004, "Inquiry Indicates Police, Drug Ties: Disturbing Reports Say Women Were Tortured and Slain as Celebration." Dallas Morning News, March 1.

Jeff Builta, 1997, "Mexico Faces Corruption, Crime, Drug Trafficking and Political Intrigue," "Crime and Justice International," v. 13, n. I, Feb., http://158.135.23.21/cjcweb/college/cji/index.cfm?ID=544.

US Dept of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2003 - Mexico.

Senate Committee Report on Drugs, Law Enforcement and Foreign Policy, 1987, Chairman Senator John Kerry, http://www.webcom.com/pinknoiz/covert/contracoke.html.

General Accounting Office, 1998, Report to the Honorable Charles B. Rangel, House of Representatives, Law Enforcement: Information on Drug-Related Police Corruption (Washington, DC: USGPO, May).

DEA Congressional Testimony, April 15, 2003, Statement of Sandalio Gonzalez, Special Agent in Charge El Paso Division, Drug Enforcement Administration, before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources.

Popular Struggle - The Mothers of Juarez and Chihuahua

Our daughters live in each one of you who fight with us to bring those responsible to justice. (Norma Ledezma, mother of Paloma Angelica Escobar Ledesma, speaking to students at Amherst Collage, Spring 2004)

The harsh light of public scrutiny has not been easy for the mothers of Juarez and Chihuahua, whose daughters have been murdered or disappeared during the past decade. Forced to confront a situation that was not of their choosing, the mothers lead a movement to stop violence and crimes against women in this tough border region.

The movement finds its roots in the emotional despair of families who lost loved ones, but also in the realization that these crimes have a gender basis - young women are the targets. Hundreds of murders occur each year in the border region. In fact, five times as many men are murdered as women. But not a single man has been murdered for the simple fact of being male. Most are victims of drug violence or other criminal activities. This certainly doesn't make the murders any less reprehensible, but they are distinct from the series of unsolved femicides. The roots of the femicides can be found in the most abject chauvinism against women that one can imagine. The young women are killed simply for being young women, and this represents the maximum expression of hatred and discrimination.

Initially, the mothers struggled nearly alone, with only family and neighbors to offer emotional support during the painful moments when their daughters disappeared or when the bodies were discovered. Eventually they turned to authorities with painful questions - Who? Why? How? - but the answers were evasive, or worse yet, non-existent. When the mothers finally gathered the courage to speak out publicly, authorities only responded with harassment and jokes, a horrendous situation that placed public officials squarely on the side of the criminals.

One of the first initiatives taken by the mothers of Juarez and Chihuahua was to search for their daughters, using their own limited resources and intuition. Under normal circumstances, this would be the work of local police, but in the state of Chihuahua it is not a crime to "disappear." Police don't generally open investigations until 72 hours after the disappearance is reported, and by that time it's often too late. The searches represent a courageous effort, considering that the crimes have always involved extremely poor women. During the first critical hours, mothers post flyers in business districts and question potential witnesses with the hope of finding their daughters alive. Even after weeks or months, when hope is but a faint glimmer, the mothers remain optimistic, doing everything humanly possible to locate their daughters. Often the investigations result in unexpected findings. In one case, the murder of Paloma Escobar Ledezma, their investigative work prevented authorities from filing charges against an ex-boyfriend who turned out to be a convenient (though completely innocent) scapegoat.

As the crime wave continued year after year, the mothers quickly lost confidence in legal authorities. In fact, many families suspect officials of complicity in the murders, if not complete indifference. Groups of mothers began to share data and keep extensive records on the disappearances and murders. Esther Chavez Cano, executive director of Casa Amiga, has been particularly active in compiling reliable, if painful, data. Other organizations like Nuestras Hijas de Regreso a Casa and Justicia Para Nuestas Hijas keep their own investigative records, which prevents the government from manipulating figures and minimizing the severity of the crisis.

Many of the mothers have built relations with non-governmental organizations, including the Coordinator (a coalition of non-governmental organizations in Ciudad Juarez), the Network of No-Violence and Human Dignity, unions and labor organization like Centro de Taller Laboral (CETLAC), and feminist groups like the 8th of March and Las Hormigas. Often these groups help the mothers organize search brigades that rake the wastelands and hills surrounding the city, or provide security surveillance at maquiladoras at the beginning and end of work shifts.

Following the murder of Sagrario Gonzalez in June 1998, the first organization of families of femicide victims was founded - Voces Sin Eco. The group quickly disintegrated because of internal squabbles complicated by official efforts to divide families in a highly emotional situation, but the organization set an important precedent by breaking the silence surrounding the femicides.

Hundreds of border residents gathered for a massive march on International Women's Day, 1999. The march, led by mothers of the victims, included the Juarez mayor and several federal Deputies. A simultaneous march in Mexico City left 183 crosses in the city center in memory of the victims.

Nuestras Hijas de Regreso a Casa was formed in 2002 in Juarez, followed later in the year by Justicia Para Nuestras Hijas in Chihuahua City. Authorities, who thought these humble women didn't have the ability to organize, have tried to silence their voices. For example, local officials tried to "integrate" the mothers into government social programs, a blatant effort to buy their silence in exchange for monthly stipends. The more tenacious mothers were the object of outright threats and intimidation, actions that have been widely criticized by human rights organization. But authorities have largely failed in their intimidation campaign. On April 16, 2002, dozens of mothers occupied the Chihuahua state capitol, forcing state representatives to increase funding for law enforcement and benefits for survivors.

The mothers organize letter-writing campaigns and protests at the state, national, and international level. In the summer of 2002, they led a march in Washington, DC, in front of the Organization of America States, site of a hemispheric tribunal that is accepting evidence on several of the unsolved murders. The mothers demanded that the crimes of Juarez be considered crimes against humanity. As a result of these actions, the Mexican government invited international human rights organizations to prepare reports on the situation in Juarez and Chihuahua. In December 2003, Norma Andrade, the mother of Juarez victim Lilia Alejandro Garcia Andrade, gave testimony in the US Congress. She reserved particularly harsh criticism for Governor Patricio Martinez, accusing him of threatening affected families.
In February 2004, a coalition of mothers, NGOs and US-based organizations organized the largest march to date in Juarez. Jane Fonda, Sally Field, and three US

Representatives drew international press attention to the femicides.
The Mothers of Juarez and Chihuahua are determined to keep the memory of their daughters alive through their struggle. Working with solidarity organizations, they began placing pink crosses on major thoroughfares in Ciudad Juarez. During a march called Exodus for Life, organized in March of 2002, the Ni Una Mas campaign placed crosses on the road from Chihuahua to Ciudad Juarez. The pink cross has become a poignant symbol of the struggle to prevent violence against women.

Today dozens of mothers are the moral leaders in the struggle against femicides in Juarez and Chihuahua. Their demands are simple: end the femicides and bring the perpetrators to justice. They are resolute in the face of official negligence and undeterred in the face of threats. There are few justice movements in the world with leaders of such uncontested moral authority and such determined perseverance. The mothers invite international participation in their movement, and encourage like-minded people to join in this important struggle for justice.

Policy prescriptions

The femicides in Chihuahua state are the most visible and distressing aspect of social decay that inevitably accompanies the neoliberal model. But neither the neoliberal model nor the social decay is inevitable. The human community is capable of better. Improvements necessarily begin at the level of governance.

- Re-negotiate NAFTA. NAFTA provides the legal framework for the neoliberal model, favoring transnational corporations over the needs of the majority of people. US activists should join dozens of campesino organizations throughout Mexico to demand the re-negotiation of NAFTA, particularly the agricultural sections that allow companies like Cargill and Archer Daniels Midland to dump products on the Mexican market below the cost of production. The re-negotiation of NAFTA should include provisions that level the playing field by subsidizing environmentally friendly campesino production while penalizing environmentally damaging corporate production. Re-negotiation of NAFTA would help to end the vicious cycle of migration that millions of Mexicans are forced to adopt as a survival strategy.

- Corporate responsibility. US-based corporations that do business overseas should be forced to adopt responsible practices, including minimum wages above the poverty level and health and safety standards. Corporations should implement new standards of internal democracy in which workers, neighbors and consumers have a direct say in production and marketing strategies. Corporations should pay their fair share of taxes so local governments can provide badly needed social services. Corporations should be forced to invest profits in local economies rather than repatriating profits to the US. And every corporation should be forced to accept a unionized workforce. Workers must be organized in order to effectively confront the massive power of corporations.

- Narco-trafficking. Drugs should be decriminalized, thereby removing the corrupting influence of drug money from the hands of mafias and cartels. Drug production and marketing should be controlled carefully by the state, accompanied by educational programs and high taxes.

- Women's bill of rights. The US should adopt a women's bill of rights, then force corporations, both overseas and domestic, to adopt the provisions. The women's bill of rights would include equal pay above the poverty level, health care, prohibitions against pregnancy testing before job placement, safety provisions including safe transportation, and social education with particular emphasis on gender rights and domestic violence.

Suggestions for Activists

The struggle to end femicides in Juarez and Chihuahua is a bi-national struggle. Many policies developed in Washington, DC, and Mexico City impact the social fabric of Juarez and Chihuahua in dramatic ways. As such, people on both sides of the border need to stand in solidarity with the families of victims as they demand justice and structural changes that will end the horrible string of femicides. In the United States, there are a number of things that activists can do:

1) Educate in your community about the femicides and the neoliberal policies that provide their context. Several educational resources are available. The Mexico Solidarity Network organizes regular speaking tours featuring mothers of the femicide victims. You can arrange for a visit to your community be contacting MSN@MexicoSolidarity.org. You can also hold public screenings of the award-winning video Señorita Extraviada, available from the Mexico Solidarity Network. Señorita Extraviada documents the disturbing course of the femicides during the past decade. The Mexico Solidarity Network offers popular education forums on femicides in the context of 21st century neoliberalism. You can host a popular education forum in your community. And copies of this booklet are available in bulk from the Mexico Solidarity Network.

2) Visit Ciudad Juarez and Chihuahua City. The Mexico Solidarity Network organizes delegations and service/learning programs in Ciudad Juarez and Chihuahua City. For a complete listing of dates, consult mexicosolidarity.prometdevelopment.com. We work with universities around the US to set up service/learning programs, January or May semesters, and alternative Spring breaks. Contact the Mexico Solidarity Network for more info.

3) Support House Resolution 466 and Senate Resolution 394. The resolutions condemn the femicides and pressure the Mexican government to take measures to resolve the crime wave and increase protection for women.

4) Join dozens of committees across the US and Mexico organizing public events on International Womens Day (March 8) and the Day of the Dead (November 2). Many groups develop creative ways to commemorate the femicides with alters and shrines. Several groups are initiating bra drives, with the bras delivered to Mexican consulates around the US. Use your creativity.

Resources and contacts

Juarez CETLAC
Beatriz Lujan (656)616-2073
cetlac@infocel.net.mx

Nuestras Hijas de Regreso A Casa
Malu Andrade (656) 620-2973
nuestras_hijas@yahoo.com.mx

Casa Amiga
Esther Chavez Cano (656) 615-4143
casaamiga@terra.com.mx

Justicia Para Nuestras Hijas
Lucha Casatro (614) 4141-7352
Alma Gomez (614) 419-3401
justiciapara_nuestrashijas@yahoo.com.mx

Comision Mexicana de promocion y Defensa de los Derechos Humanos
Adriana Carmona 55-84-9116

Mexico Solidarity Network MSN@MexicoSolidarity.org
Chicago office - 773-583-7728
Washington office - 202-544-9355
San Francisco office - 415-621-8100

Amigos de las Mujueres de Juarez
amigosdemujeres@yahoo.com

Webpages:
Amigos de las Mujeres de Juarez
www.amigosdemujeres.org/

Casa Amiga
http://www.casa-amiga.org/

Justicia Para Nuestras Hijas
http://www.geocities.com/jpnh123/index.htm

Comision Mexicana de defense y promocion de derechos Humanos
http://www.cmdpdh.org/

Mexico Solidarity Network
http://mexicosolidarity.prometdevelopment.com